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Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the
Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. *
Over the last twenty years, a quiet revolution has taken place
in patent law Traditionally, patents were rarely valid, but if
valid, broadly enforced. Since Congress created the Federal
Circuit in 1982 and vested it with exclusive intermediate ap-
pellate jurisdiction over patent appeals, patents have become
routinely valid, but narrowly enforced. This article evaluates
the economic consequences of this revolution. Focusing on the
reasons for, and the costs of, uniformity in patent protection,
this article shows that the revolution will tend to limit the pat-
ent system's ability to ensure the expected profitability, and
hence the existence, of desirable, but high cost innovation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last twenty years, a quiet revolution has taken place in pat-
ent law. Before 1982, courts strictly enforced the nonobviousness re-
quirement in an attempt to limit patents to "those inventions which
would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a pat-
ent.' At the same time, courts broadly interpreted a patent's scope
under the doctrine of equivalents, so that a patent would reach any
product or process that performed "substantially the same function
in substantially the same way to obtain the same result. '2 Taken to-
* Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law, New Orleans, Louisiana. I
would like to thank Mark Lemley, Leslie Lunney, Kimberly Moore, Tom Nachbar, and
my dissertation committee, David Malueg, Ila Alam, and Emilson de Silva for helpful
comments and suggestions. As always, any remaining mistakes are my responsibility
1 Graham v John Deere, 383 US 1, 11 (1966).
2 Machine Co vMurphy, 97 US 120, 125 (1877); see also Sanitary Refrigerator Co v
Winters, 280 US 30, 42 (1929) (quoting function-way-result standard with approval);
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gether, these two doctrinal interpretations ensured that patents were
rarely valid, but if valid, broadly enforced. However, since 1982, the
nature of patent protection has gradually changed. In that year, Con-
gress created the Federal Circuit and vested it with exclusive inter-
mediate appellate jurisdiction over appeals from patent litigation.
3
Intended, at least by some of its supporters, to rescue patents from a
judiciary often suspicious, if not overtly hostile, towards patents, the
Federal Circuit has taken its role as defender of the patent system se-
riously. Using its exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, and rely-
ing on the sporadic and inherently limited nature of Supreme Court
review, the Federal Circuit has rewritten the nonobviousness require-
ment and the doctrine of equivalents, sharply limiting their reach.
Where traditionally only those innovations that represented sub-
stantial technical advances would satisfy the nonobviousness re-
quirement, under the Federal Circuit's interpretation, even a minor
technical advance will suffice. Where traditionally, the doctrine of
equivalents would reach most competing variations of a patented in-
vention, under the Federal Circuit's interpretation, even directly
competing substitutes will often prove noninfringing. As a result, un-
der the Federal Circuit we have moved from patents that were rarely
valid, but if valid broadly enforced, towards patents that are routinely
valid, but narrowly enforced.
Although the Court undoubtedly has some power to reign in the
Federal Circuit's rewriting of patent law, the Court has so far shown
surprisingly little willingness to do so. With respect to the nonobvi-
ousness requirement, even where the Federal Circuit has expressly
and directly rejected contrary Court authority, the Court has (so far)
entirely refused to revisit the issue. With respect to the doctrine
of equivalents, the Court has recently begun to play a more active
role, granting certiorari in two cases, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chemical Co.4 and in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co.,5 in which the Federal Circuit had narrowed sharply
the doctrine of equivalents. Rather than rebuke the Federal Circuit,
however, the Court largely embraced the Federal Circuit's doctrinal
revisions.6 Although the Court expressly refused to eliminate the
Graver Tank & Mfg Co v Linde Air Prods Co, 339 US 605, 608 (1950) (quoting
function-way-result standard with approval).
3 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Public L No 97-164, 96 Stat 25 (cod-
ified in scattered portions of 28 USC).
4 520US 17 (1997).
5 535 US 722 (2002).
6 Even in rejecting aspects of the Federal Circuit's approach, the Court in Warner-
Jenkinson Co emphasized the Federal Circuit's special expertise in patent law. In dis-
cussing whether the traditional "function-way-result" or the alternative "insubstan-
tial variation" represented a superior verbal formulation of the doctrine of equivalents,
the Court stated: "[Wie see no purpose in going further and micro-managing the Fed-
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doctrine of equivalents altogether, as some members of the Federal
Circuit desired, the Court neither actively defended the doctrine nor
restored its pre-Federal Circuit scope. Instead, the Court largely af-
firmed a sharply narrower role for the doctrine of equivalents.
Given its refusal to revisit the Federal Circuit's changes to the
nonobviousness doctrine and its decision largely to affirm the Fed-
eral Circuit's changes to the doctrine of equivalents, the Court has
likely reinforced the trend towards routinely valid, but narrowly en-
forced patents already evident in Federal Circuit decisions over the
last ten years. The question thus becomes whether this transforma-
tion of patents is desirable. To evaluate this transformation, this ar-
ticle begins in Part II with a statistical summary of appellate patent
litigation over the last sixty years. Despite the Federal Circuit's pro-
patent holder reputation, this summary reveals that claims of patent
infringement are no more likely to succeed since the Federal Circuit's
advent. However, where historically, claims of patent infringement
failed because the court ruled the patent invalid or otherwise unen-
forceable, claims of patent infringement fail today because the de-
fendant's product or process falls outside the scope of the plaintiff's
patent. Part III of this article then identifies the doctrinal changes
that appear to have driven the apparent trends in patent enforceabil-
ity. Together, Parts II and III establishes the Federal Circuit's shift to-
wards routinely valid, but narrowly enforced patents.
After setting the stage, Parts IV, V, and VI examine the economic
consequences of the Federal Circuit's transformation of patents. Un-
der the traditional economic analysis of patents, the costs of patent
protection arise directly from the tension between a regime of private
rights and the public good character of an innovations information
component. The point of private property is to enable its owner to
exclude others, but excluding others from a good characterized by
nonrivalrous consumption is not Pareto optimal. Patents are costly,
under the traditional analysis, precisely to the extent that this ten-
sion between a private right of exclusion and the nonrivalrous char-
acter of an innovations information component reduces the innova-
tion's social utility.
If we used the traditional economic approach to evaluate the
switch to routinely valid, but narrowly enforced patents, the tradi-
tional approach would identify two, potentially offsetting, conse-
quences. On the one hand, effectively eliminating the nonobvious-
ness requirement would impose a social loss by extending patent
protection to innovations that would have been devised and disclosed
eral Circuit's particular word-choice for analyzing equivalence. We expect that the Fed-
eral Circuit will refine the formulation of the test for equivalence in the orderly course
of case-by-case determinations, and we leave such refinement to that court's sound
judgment in this area of its special expertise.' Warner-Jenkinson Co, 520 US at 40.
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without the inducement of a patent. On the other hand, narrowing
the scope of protection should yield social benefits by reducing the
private rights-public good tension for patented innovations. Whether,
under the traditional economic approach, the social losses would out-
weigh the social benefits is simply unclear.
Rather than follow the traditional economic approach, this article
reexamines the economics of patents in an attempt to understand
more clearly the role the nonobviousness doctrine and the doctrine
of equivalents play within the economic structure of patent law. This
reexamination identifies information, agency, and other transaction
costs as the keys to understanding patent law. With perfect informa-
tion, and in the absence of agency and transaction costs, the patent
system would likely7 prove both unnecessary and undesirable. In
such a perfect world, a Lindahl-style contribution scheme,8 for ex-
ample could ensure optimal innovation. Moreover, if we could make
such a scheme work, it would ensure optimal innovation without re-
quiring a regime of exclusive rights inconsistent with the nonrival-
rous consumption of the innovations information component. How-
ever, in the real world, information, agency, and transaction costs
undoubtedly exist. In their presence, a regime of exclusive rights may
prove more efficient and effective for encouraging some types of in-
7 Despite the usual assumption that private ownership of public goods reduces the
social value of the associated public good, over the years, a few commentators have ar-
gued that property rights in certain kinds of information increase the information's so-
cial value, despite the information's public good character. See Edmund W Kitch, The
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 JL & Econ 265, 276-77 (1977); see also
Mark E Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 Va L Rev 305
(1992); E Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inven-
tions, 85 Minn L Rev 697 (2000). Essentially, these commentators argue either that in-
formation goods are subject to the same type of overuse problems that can plague com-
monly owned private goods or that private ownership of information can otherwise
enhance desirable coordination. Although I tend to reject these arguments for reasons
that others have given, see, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Com-
plex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum L Rev 839, 872-79 (1990) (arguing that while
patent races seem wasteful, the competition they generate improves the speed with
which innovation occurs and thereby leads to more innovations than alternative of
single firm exploitation of an innovation); Robert P. Merges, Commentary: Rent Con-
trol in the Patent District: Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 Va L Rev
359 (1992); a full discussion of these arguments is beyond the scope of this article. For
purposes of this article, I will accept the traditional view that granting exclusive rights
in the information component of an innovation, while perhaps necessary to ensure the
innovations existence ex ante, will reduce the innovations social value ex post.
8 See Knut Wicksell, A New Principle of Just Taxation (1896), reprinted in Richard
A. Musgrave & Alan T Peacock eds, Classics in the Theory of Public Finance 72 (St
Martin's Pr, 1958) (JM. Buchanan trans); Erik Lindahl, Just Taxation-A Positive Solu-
tion (1919) (Elizabeth Henderson trans), reprinted in Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T
Peacock eds, Classics in the Theory of Public Finance (St Martin's Pr, 1958). For fur-
ther discussion of what has been called the Wicksell-Lindahl tax, see Jules L. Coleman,
Markets, Morals and the Law 278-81 (Cambridge, 1988).
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novative activity. Even where a regime of exclusive rights represents
the best available alternative for encouraging certain types of innova-
tion, the social value of an innovation will presumably be somewhat
less if protected by a patent than if its public good aspect could have
been freely and fully exploited. Yet, if providing patent protection en-
sures the creation of a desirable information product and does so
more efficiently than the plausible alternatives, such as patent prizes
or direct government subsidies, 9 the fact that the information prod-
uct could have been more valuable still in the absence of the patent's
protection has little practical significance. 1 0
Nevertheless, the continuing tension between private rights and
public goods suggests that, even where patents are the best available
policy mechanism, we should provide patent protection only if, and
to the precise extent, necessary to secure each individual innovations
ex ante expected profitability.1 Yet, the same information, agency,
and transaction costs that require the use of a patent regime in the
first place also limit our ability to tailor patent protection to each in-
dividual innovation. In the face of imperfect information and po-
tential agency and transaction costs, the historical practice of both
patent and copyright law has been to provide more-or-less uniform
protection for a creative product or process that satisfies a given set
of more-or-less uniform prerequisites. With uniformity, expanding
patent protection may increase the incentive for, and thereby ensure
the existence of, additional innovative products. However, if we ex-
pand protection uniformly to all of the creative works that satisfy a
given set of prerequisites, expanded protection will also apply to
those innovative products that would have been produced with no or
less protection ("preexisting" products). Given uniformity, determin-
ing the optimal scope of patent (or copyright) protection becomes a
I For a discussion of some of the advantages and disadvantages of various ap-
proaches to encouraging innovation, see Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention
Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 Am Econ Rev 691 (1983); see
also Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113
Quarterly J Econ 1137 (1998); Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, Novelty and Disclo-
sure in Patent Law, 21 Rand J Econ 131 (1990). Generally speaking, the principal ad-
vantage of a regime of exclusive rights is that such a regime, in addition to tying the re-
wards for innovation market directly to the innovations marketplace success, tends
to decentralize the decision-making process, assigning decision-making responsibility
to those likely to possess the relevant, but otherwise private, information. Awarding
an innovator an exclusive right to her innovation allows the would-be innovator to
decide whether the expected rents available exceed her reservation cost for the inno-
vation. It also allows an innovator to threaten to exclude a consumer from access to
the innovation in order to force the consumer to reveal her true reservation price for
the innovation.
,0 See R. H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 JL & Econ 357 (1974).
11 I recognize that an innovator's reservation cost must include the cost not only of
those research efforts that succeed, but also the associated research efforts that will fail.
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balancing of the value gained from the additional creative output that
broader protection may ensure against the value lost from the re-
duced ability to exploit the information component of the preexist-
ing products. As we extend protection to a broader range of preexist-
ing innovations, any given expansion in protection becomes more
costly, dragging down the optimal level of protection.
This uniformity insight, largely missing from existing analyses of
patent and copyright; suggests both that: (1) patent protection must
refuse to provide protection sufficient to ensure an expectation of
profit for the full range of innovative products eligible for patents,
even in cases where the innovative products represent the most valu-
able use of society's resources; and (2) although variation in protec-
tion entails its own costs, there may be instances where tailoring pro-
tection will prove desirable in order to limit the costs of uniformity.
In addition and most importantly, the costs of uniformity dictate that
any system of uniform rights over information must be narrowly tai-
lored to a particular instance where the incentives available from a
market, operating against a background of private rights in tangible
things alone, leave a significant gap between an innovative product's
expected desirability, relative to alternative uses of the resources, and
its expected profitability. Because the costs of uniformity increase
with the divergence between the optimal level of uniform protection
and the optimal level of individualized protection for the range of in-
novative products eligible for protection, we should strive to limit
application of a uniform system of intellectual property rights to
"similar" innovative products. To minimize the costs of uniformity,
innovative products are "similar" precisely to the extent that: (1) a
given set of uniform prerequisites defines when a significant gap will
likely arise between the desirability of an innovative product (relative
to alternate uses of the resources) and its expected profitability; and
(2) a given set of uniform exclusive rights approximates the protec-
tion precisely necessary to close that gap for the range of innovative
products eligible for protection.
Having identified the costs of uniformity as a key to understand-
ing the economic structure of patent law, the article then moves in
Parts V and VI to examine whether the shift towards routinely valid,
but narrowly enforced patents, is likely to promote "the Progress
of... the useful Arts." Viewed in terms of the costs of uniformity, the
shift entails two central consequences. First, rewriting the nonobvi-
ousness doctrine to allow patents even for those innovations that
would have been devised and disclosed in the absence of a patent both
directly reduces the social value of the overprotected innovations and
indirectly reduces the optimal level of patent protection. By expand-
ing the category of preexisting innovative products to which any
given uniform increase in protection will apply, effectively eliminat-
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ing the nonobviousness requirement increases the costs of any given
expansion in patent protection. The switch to routinely valid patents
therefore drags down the optimal level of uniform patent protection
and reduces the patent system's ability to encourage desirable, but
costly innovation. Second, narrowing the nonobviousness require-
ment and the doctrine of equivalents eliminates two sources of vari-
ability in patent protection. Under the traditional interpretations of
these doctrines, the legal system could use information from post-
innovation developments to tailor the patent protection an innovation
received to the level precisely necessary to ensure that innovations ex
ante expected profitability. Because such tailoring reduces the costs
of uniformity, tailoring enables the patent system to expand protec-
tion for, and thereby ensure the expected profitability of, more costly
innovations, without unduly overprotecting less costly innovations.
By reducing the legal system's ability to tailor protection to the indi-
vidually optimal level, the switch to routinely valid, patents narrowly
enforced leads to a "one size fits all" protection scheme that again
limits the patent system's ability to ensure more costly innovations.
Although this article does not attempt to resolve the ultimate de-
sirability of the switch as an empirical issue, focusing on the costs of
uniformity identifies, more precisely than the traditional analysis,
the economic trade-off at stake in the switch. Specifically, the switch
to a "one-size fits all" patent system will tend to promote the goals
of the patent system if and only if the information and agency costs
entailed in: (i) separating and precluding patents for those innova-
tions that would have occurred in the absence of a patent; and (ii) in-
dividually tailoring protection to the level precisely necessary to en-
able an innovator to capture her reservation cost; exceed the social
value of the additional innovations such tailoring efforts can ensure.
We begin with an empirical analysis of appellate patent decisions
over the last sixty years and the changing nature of patent protection.
II. THE CHANGING NATURE OF
PATENT PROTECTION
Since Congress created the Federal Circuit and vested it with exclu-
sive intermediate appellate jurisdiction over patent appeals in 1982,
the nature of patent protection has changed. Although often perceived
as a pro-patent holder court, 12 an empirical examination of appellate
12 See, e.g., Robert L. Harmon, Patents and the Federal Circuit 684-740 (Bureau of
National Affairs Inc, 3d ed 1994); Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patent hold-
ers' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of
Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 Mich L Rev 985, 1024 & nn.99-100
(1999) (noting that the Federal Circuit is more "pro-patent" than its predecessor
courts); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
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patent litigation over the last sixty years suggests that a patent holder
is no more likely to succeed on a patent infringement claim under the
Federal Circuit than under the circuit courts it replaced. Yet, when
we break down the reasons why patent holders fail to succeed on
their infringement claims, we find two significant differences under
the Federal Circuit. First, there has been a sharp reduction in the per-
centage of patent infringement claims that fail because the patent is
found invalid or otherwise unenforceable. And, second, there has
been a sharp increase in the percentage of patent infringement claims
that fail because the allegedly infringing device or process is found to
fall outside the patent claims. The statistics therefore suggest a shift
from rarely valid, but broadly enforced towards routinely valid, but
narrowly enforced, patents since 1982. We begin our examination of
this shift with a statistical summary of the appellate resolutions of
patent infringement litigation over the last sixty years.
Courts, 64 NYU L Rev 1, 17-20, 25-26 (1989) (describing Federal Circuit's sensitivity to
patent policy and resulting pro-patent owner stance in substantive issues as well as im-
proved availability of remedies and preliminary injunctive relief); Lawrence G. Kas-
triner, The Revival of Confidence in the Patent System, 73 J Pat & Trademark Off Soc'y
5, 13 (1991); Allan N. Littman, Restoring the Balance of Our Patent System, 37 IDEA
545 (1997) (noting that the Federal Circuit is overwhelmingly pro-patent) Allan N.
Littman, The Jury's Role in Determining Key Issues in Patent Cases: Markman,
Hilton Davis and Beyond, 37 IDEA 207, 209 (1997) ("Patent lawyers have perceived
both juries and the Federal Circuit to be pro-patent"); Robert P. Merges, Commercial
Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 Calif L Rev
805, 822 (1988) (noting Federal Circuit's pro-patent reputation); Alexander E. Silver-
man, Intellectual Property Law and the Venture Capitalist Process, 5 High Tech L J
157, 161 (1989) (stating that creation of Federal Circuit has increased power of patents);
Symposium: Early Patent Publication: A Boon or Bane? A Discussion on the Legal
and Economic Effects of Publishing Patent Applications After Eighteen Months of Fil-
ing, 16 Cardozo Arts & Enter LJ 601, 623 (noting that "the Federal Circuit is very pro-
patent") (statement of Douglas Wyatt, Senior Partner, Wyatt, Gerber, Meller, &
O'Rourke); David Silverstein, Patents, Science and Innovation: Historical Linkages
and Implications for Global Technological Competitive-ness, 17 Rutgers Computer
& Tech L J 261, 310-11 (1991) (noting that "statistics as well as perceptions of the pat-
ent bar" showed the Federal Circuit to be "pro-patent"); Thomas G. Field, Jr., Zurko
Raises Issue of Patentability Standards, Natl L J at C2 (Feb 8, 1999) ("Because the in-
validity rate is now lower than it was between the 1930s and the 1960s, some suspect
federal circuit judges, even those not formerly on the CCPA, of being unduly 'pro-
patent.' Former corporate patent counsel seem to be particularly suspect."). The per-
ception of a pro-patent bias has become so strong at times that a number of Federal Cir-
cuit judges have felt the need to step forward and affirmatively deny the supposed bias.
See Howard T. Markey, The Federal Circuit and Congressional Intent, 41 Am U L Rev
577, 579 (1992) ("The uninformed, unsupported, and unsupportable assertion that the
Federal Circuit might somehow become biased in favor of patents has apparently by
now foundered on the facts."); Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative
Response, 40 Am U L Rev 1003, 1013 (1991) ("In addition, actual practice reveals that
the Federal Circuit has not become the specialized court of limited jurisdiction its de-
tractors feared. Rather, the court hears cases in virtually every area permitted by its ju-
risdictional statute and shows no overt favoritism in patent disputes.').
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To explore the changing nature of patent protection under the Fed-
eral Circuit, I conducted an empirical investigation of all appellate
decisions arising from patent infringement' 3 litigation in six pre-
Federal Circuit time periods beginning with the period 1944-1946,
and since January 1, 1984.' 4 As has become the practice, I conducted
a population, rather than a sample, study and included all intermedi-
ate appellate utility 5 patent infringement decisions that were avail-
able in the "US Court of Appeals Cases-Federal Circuit" LEXIS
database for the post-Federal Circuit periods or in the "Federal
Cases-Combined Courts" LEXIS database for the pre-Federal Cir-
cuit periods. The defined population included 1,492 decisions, and
included both published and Rule 36 summary affirmances.
After identifying cases in the relevant population, I initially iden-
tified each case as one of three results: (1) "success;" (2) "failure;" or
(3) "non-final" resolutions where a patent holder neither succeeded
nor failed. "Success" was defined as a decision where a patent holder
obtained preliminary or permanent injunctive relief, or damages, on
any patent claim at issue in the litigation. 16 "Failure" was defined as
a decision where the appellate court finally resolved all claims of pat-
ent infringement and no claim of patent infringement in the case
succeeded. The final category consisted of non-final decisions, where
a patent holder did not succeed in obtaining the relief sought, but the
claims of infringement were not finally rejected by the court. Rather,
the appellate court reversed the ruling of the district court on one as-
pect or another, and remanded the case for further proceedings.' For
the second category of cases, I also determined whether the claims at
issue in the litigation failed because: (1) the claims were found invalid
13 Appeals from Patent and Trademark Office decisions as to whether to issue a pat-
ent were excluded from the study.
14 The author used a search of "core-terms (patent and infring!)" and an appropriate
date restriction to identify initially the relevant cases. This search tended to exclude
appeals from decisions of the Patent and Trademark Office refusing to issue a patent,
but to obtain all patent infringement cases, whether the central issue was infringe-
ment or validity. To supplement this initial search, an additional search of "core-terms
(patent and obviousness)" with an appropriate date restriction was conducted.
Is Rulings involving design or plant patents were excluded from the study.
16 Under this definition, a patent holder was considered to have succeeded even if the
patent holder did not obtain relief on all patent claims at issue and even if some pat-
ent claims at issue were held invalid. Although other definitions of "success" might be
used, compare Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 Mich Telecommun & Tech L Rev
363 (2001) (using a claim-by-claim analysis of patent litigation to evaluate the chang-
ing role of obviousness), I felt that this approach appropriately recognized the fact that
patents are drafted with multiple claims specifically to account for the possibility that
some of the claims might-be found invalid or not infringed in a subsequent case.
17 If such an initially non-final resolution subsequently came before an appellate
court a second time, then it would again be classified into one of the three identified
categories depending on the result in the second appeal.
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or otherwise unenforceable"8; or (2) the allegedly infringing product
or process did not fall within the scope of the patent claims at issue,
either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. A summary of
the data, by period, is included in Appendix I.
Figure 1 presents the percentage of cases in which a patent holder
succeeded on a claim for patent infringement in each of the six pre-
Federal Circuit time periods, and for successive two-year periods
from 1984 through 2001. To facilitate comparison between the pre-
and post-Federal Circuit time periods, Figure 1 also presents the av-
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Figure 1. Percentage of All Population Cases 2° in Which a Patent Holder Succeeded
on a Patent Infringement Claim
11 The "average" rates for the pre- and post-Federal Circuit periods are calculated as
the arithmetic average of the six pre-Federal Circuit time periods and the nine two-year
post-Federal Circuit periods, respectively
19 Under the author's definition of success, cases where the appellate court re-
manded the case for further proceedings were not considered a success for the patent
holder. These non-final resolutions were however included in the count of total cases,
and therefore reduced the calculated success rate. Nevertheless, even under alternative
definitions, the basic conclusion-that success rates have not increased significantly
under the Federal Circuit-remains unchanged, as do the general trends in the data.
For example, if we excluded nonfinal decisions from our sample, then the average pre-
Federal Circuit success rate would rise to 36.8 percent and the average post-Federal Cir-
cuit success rate would rise to 35.6 percent. Even with the nonfinal decisions excluded
from the sample, the overall success rate remains statistically unchanged. In addition,
even with nonfinal decisions excluded, the trends in the data remain the same: The
success rate under the Federal Circuit begins generally higher in the Federal Circuit's
early years from 1984-1989, reaches its peak in 1988-1989, and then declines steadily
from 1990-2001.
20 This category includes those cases where a patent was held invalid for a failure to
satisfy the statutory requirements of sections 101, 102, 103, 112 of the Patent Act, or
because the court held the patent invalid or unenforceable under a judge-made doc-
trine, such as inequitable conduct or patent misuse.
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As Figure 1 reflects, patent holder overall success rates have fallen
from an average of 33.5 % in the periods before, to 28.4% after, the cre-
ation of the Federal Circuit. Moreover, most of this fall has occurred
since the 1988-1989 period. If we focus on the years 1984-1989, at the
outset of the Federal Circuit's tenure, patent holders succeeded in
41.4% of the appellate cases, with patent holder success rates peak-
ing in 1988-1989 at 50%-well above the patent holder's average suc-
cess rate in the pre-Federal Circuit era. If, on the other hand, we focus
on the results since 1989, patent holder success rates under the Fed-
eral Circuit fell to an average of 24.4% for 1990 to 2001, trended gen-
erally lower throughout this period, and reached their lowest level
(16.7%) in the most recent period under study (2000-2001).
Although not statistically significant, 2' the drop in success rates
following the creation of the Federal Circuit contradicts, or at least,
does not support, the usual portrait of the Federal Circuit as a pro-
patent holder forum. 22 Yet, because of the self-selection involved in
appellate litigation, the fact that the success rate does not change sig-
nificantly with the Federal Circuit's advent is not altogether surpris-
ing. Commentators usually suggest that parties involved in litigation
will settle those cases where both sides can accurately predict the
likely outcome.23 Particularly where one party or the other is very
21 If we treat each of the six pre-Federal Circuit and each of the post-Federal Circuit
time periods as discrete data points, with a normal distribution around their mean,
then we can calculate a confidence interval around the average success rate for the pre-
and post-Federal Circuit eras. At a 95 percent, two-tailed, level of confidence, the con-
fidence interval was ±3.7 percent for the pre-Federal Circuit periods and ±7.4 percent
for the post-Federal Circuit periods. Because the confidence intervals for the pre- and
post-Federal Circuit periods overlap, the difference between the average success rates
in the two periods is not statistically significant at a 5 percent confidence level. For a
similar approach to hypothesis testing, see John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empir-
ical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA QJ 185, 194 n.20 (1998)
(noting that a population sample can be treated as a subset of randomly distributed ob-
servations from a larger superpopulation of possible cases for appellate resolution).
22 For example, in testimony before the Federal Trade Commission during its recent
round of hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the
Knowledge-Based Economy, Professor Mike Scherer stated:
[S]tatistically it used to be, before the Federal Circuit came into existence, about
two-thirds of patents that were litigated were found either invalid or not in-
fringed or both. Two-thirds of the cases, the patent holder lost. That has nearly
reversed since the Federal Circuit.
Testimony of E M. Scherer, Hearing of the Federal Trade Commission on Trends in Fed-
eral Circuit Jurisprudence, July 10, 2002, at 33-34 (transcript available at http://
www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/O2071Otrans.pdf) (last visited December 14, 2002). For an
expression of similar perceptions of the Federal Circuit as a pro-patent forum, see the
sources cited in note 12.
23 See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Liti-
gation, 13 J Legal Stud 1, 5 (1983) (mathematical model demonstrates that individual
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likely to win on appeal, the usual expectation is that they will settle
accordingly. The opportunity to settle usually leaves for appellate de-
cision those cases where there are relatively evenly balanced argu-
ments on each side, leading to the expectation of similarly balanced
results. While an unexpected change in patent law may temporarily
shift the balance in favor of one party or the other, parties should
quickly adjust their expectations, and settlement offers or demands,
accordingly. As a result, even when the law changes unexpectedly, we
should nevertheless expect a fairly rapid return to the norm.
However, rather than a 50-50 norm, the patent appellate success
rates appear to center around a 30-70 norm. Although there are a
number of possible explanations for this,24 the availability of injunc-
tive relief probably best explains the 30-70 norm. Unlike a monetary
remedy, which can be directly discounted by the patent holder's
chance of success to determine an appropriate settlement figure,
discounting the possibility of injunctive relief for settlement is not so
straightforward. Although the parties can attempt to value the possi-
bility of injunctive relief in monetary terms, both uncertainty and
idiosyncratic considerations are likely to complicate that effort.
More importantly patent holders and alleged infringers calculate the
value of an injunction from radically different perspectives. For the
patent holder, the value of an injunction consists in the additional
rents earned if the would-be competitor is successfully excluded from
the market. In contrast, an alleged infringer values the possibility of
injunctive relief based upon the rents that he expects to earn if suc-
cessful in entering the market. Because the market will become more
competitive after entry, successful entry will reduce the total rents
available. The alleged infringer, if allowed to enter, will thus not only
split the producer surplus pie with the patent holder, but will also
reduce the size of the pie available. As a result, the alleged infringer's
maximizing decisions of the parties will create a strong bias for a 50% success rate for
plaintiffs or appellants at trial). But see Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Ef-
fect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J Legal Stud 337 (1990)
(criticizing Priest-Klein methodology and rejecting their 50% hypothesis as a descrip-
tion of all civil litigation).
2'4 These alternative explanations would include the possibility that patent holders
sometimes pursue weak claims of infringement in order to establish or maintain a liti-
gious reputation. Alternatively, litigants may not be fully informed regarding their
chances of success. For example, the parties involved may not be as fully informed as
the available information would permit regarding their respective likelihood of suc-
cess. Plaintiffs' attorneys, for example, may overestimate their chances of success,
choosing to rely on the Federal Circuit's general pro-patent holder reputation to ensure
their victory rather than undertaking a more realistic appraisal. Such explanations,
while possibilities, are not entirely satisfactory, however. For such an explanation to
account for the observed change in success rates, we would not only have to assume
that the parties involved are relatively uninformed, but that they became relatively less
informed after the advent of the Federal Circuit, and particularly so since 1989.
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expected share of the rents available after entry will necessarily prove
smaller, and depending on the precise market conditions at issue, po-
tentially much smaller than the patent holder's expected loss should
entry occur.25 As a result, depending on the market conditions ex-
pected if entry occurs, the parties may prove unable to find mutually
acceptable settlement terms even in cases where both parties agree
that the patent holder has an objectively small chance of success.
26
Because these and other considerations, in combination with the
parties' ability to mutually select cases for appellate resolution, will
tend to dictate an expected norm for patent holder success rates2 7 we
25 To take one possible example, if the parties expect to engage in Bertrand compe-
tition by offering identical products and competing for customers on prices if the al-
leged infringer is allowed to enter the market, then both parties will expect price to fall
to marginal cost if entry occurs. Under such competition, neither the patent holder nor
the alleged infringed will earn any producer surplus if entry occurs. The alleged in-
fringer could therefore offer nothing more than the expected litigation costs in return
for dismissal of the patent infringement action. Even if the patent holder has an ob-
jectively small chance of successfully excluding the alleged infringer from the market,
the minimum amount the patent holder would accept to dismiss the infringement ac-
tion may exceed the alleged infringer's maximum settlement offer. While Bertrand
competition is not inevitable in every market where entry occurs, it illustrates the type
of sharp reduction in expected total rents that may leave an alleged infringer unable to
offer a price sufficient to purchase from the patent holder even an objectively small
chance of obtaining injunctive relief.
26 As a theoretical matter, the parties always have room for settlement if they can
agree on the patent holder's chance of success. On the one hand, the parties have room
for a settlement that would allow the alleged infringer to enter the market in return for
a payment from the alleged infringer if: the rents lost by the patent holder if entry is
allowed multiplied by the expected chance of success are less than the rents that the
alleged infringer expects to earn from entry. On the other hand, the parties have room
for a settlement in which the alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market in return
for a payment from the patent holder if: the rents lost by the patent holder if entry is
allowed multiplied by the expected chance of success are greater than the rents that
the alleged infringer expects to earn from entry. For that reason, at least in theory, there
should always be room for a settlement of one type or the other. However, in my expe-
rience, patent holders are seldom willing to settle on terms that require them (as they
see it) to pay to enforce their patents. Although a full consideration of the issue is be-
yond the scope of this article, presumably such a refusal to pay can be justified as a per-
fectly rational desire to avoid creating a parade of would-be competitors, each de-
manding a similar payment not to enter.
27 The relevant question for our purposes is whether the considerations that may
drive a patent holder to pursue a claim on which she is unlikely to succeed have both:
(i) changed; and (ii) changed at the same times as the observed changes in success rates.
If the considerations that may drive a patent holder to pursue an objectively weak
claim have changed and at the same times as the observed changes in success rate, then
the reduction in average patent holder success rating under the Federal Circuit may not
be due solely to some underlying doctrinal change. Nevertheless, as we shall see, see
text accompanying notes 35-131, the statistical picture is consistent with the Federal
Circuit's doctrinal changes. As a result, even if the statistics alone do not establish a
causal relationship, together with these other considerations, they present a strong cir-
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must take care not to read too much regarding patent enforceability
into appellate litigation "success" statistics alone. However more or
less willing to enforce patents the Federal Circuit may be relative to
the circuit courts that it replaced, we should expect parties to adjust
for that willingness in their settlement negotiations, leaving for ap-
pellate resolution only those cases where the benefit of an appeal for
both parties exceeds the cost of foregoing the alternative of private
settlement. To the extent that a thirty percent success rate appears to
represent the point at which both parties prefer appeal to settlement
before the advent of the Federal Circuit, we should expect the appel-
late success rate to remain roughly constant after the Federal Cir-
cuit's advent, ceteris paribus.
28
Nevertheless, if we focus on the reasons why patent claims have
failed, we find two sharp differences between the Federal Circuit and
the circuit courts that it replaced. First, the Federal Circuit is far less
likely to reject a claim of patent infringement on the grounds that the
patent at issue is invalid or otherwise unenforceable. Second, the Fed-
eral Circuit is far more likely to reject a claim of patent infringement
on the grounds that the patent at issue was not infringed.
Figure 2 presents the percentage of cases in which claims of patent
infringement failed because the patent(s) at issue was found invalid or
otherwise unenforceable, both on average and for the particular six
pre- and nine post-Federal Circuit periods under study.
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Figure 2. Percentage of Failure Results Due to Ruling that Patent Was Invalid or
Otherwise Unenforceable
cumstantial case that the Federal Circuit is changing patent law to reduce, on average,
patent enforceability
28 While the mutual selection of cases for appellate resolution limits our ability to
interpret success rates as evidence of enforceability directly, to the extent that mutual
selection dictates an expected norm, the extent to which success rates vary from the
expected norm are direct evidence of the parties' abilities to predict appellate resolu-
tion accurately. For a discussion of this issue, see text accompanying notes 191-196.
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As Figure 2 reveals, patent invalidity is significantly 29 less likely to
be the reason why a claim of patent infringement fails under the Fed-
eral Circuit. Before the Federal Circuit, invalidity accounted for fully
three-quarters of the cases in which claims of patent infringement
failed. In contrast, after the Federal Circuit's creation, invalidity ac-
counted for just more than one-third of the failure results. If we ex-
amine more carefully this reduction in invalidity results, we find a
sharply reduced role for the nonobviousness requirement as the prin-
cipal reason. In the pre-Federal Circuit era, a ruling that the patent
claim(s) at issue was invalid due to obviousness accounted for 64.8
percent of the failure results. In contrast, under the Federal Circuit, a
failure to satisfy the nonobviousness requirement accounted for only
14.6 percent of the failure results.
Figure 3, on the other hand, presents the percentage of cases in
which a claim of patent infringement fails because, as either a legal
or factual matter, the allegedly infringing device or process was found
to fall outside the scope of the patent claims at issue.
1
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Figure 3. Percentage of Failure Results Due to Ruling that Patent Was Not Infringed
As Figure 3 reflects, an inability to establish infringement is sig-
nificantly30 more likely to be the reason why a claim of patent in-
fringement fails under the Federal Circuit. In the pre-Federal Circuit
era, a failure to establish infringement accounted for roughly one-
29 Treating the failure due to invalidity results for the six pre-Federal Circuit and
nine post-Federal Circuit periods as discrete data points, and assuming a normal dis-
tribution of the data, the 95 percent confidence intervals were ±12.0 percent for the
pre-Federal Circuit periods and ±9.4 percent for the post-Federal Circuit periods.
30 Treating the failure due to non-infringement results for the six pre-Federal Cir-
cuit and nine post-Federal Circuit periods as discrete data points, and assuming a nor-
mal distribution, the 95 percent confidence intervals were ±13.4 percent for the pre-
Federal Circuit periods and ±10.2 percent for the post-Federal Circuit periods.
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quarter3" of the cases in which claims of patent infringement failed.
However, under the Federal Circuit, an inability to establish infringe-
ment accounted for more than two-thirds of the failure results.
Although (again) we must be careful of drawing inferences too
readily from appellate patent litigation results because of the self-
selection problem, 32 the timing and extent of the changes in the rel-
ative importance of invalidity and non-infringement in explaining
why patent claims fail leave the indelible impression that the Federal
Circuit is deliberately and systematically changing the nature of pat-
ent law. As the pre-Federal Circuit statistics reflect, appellate courts
before the Federal Circuit actively policed the prerequisites for pat-
ent protection, strictly enforcing the nonobviousness requirement in
particular to ensure that a discovery represented a substantial tech-
nical advance before it received a patent monopoly. However, once a
discovery satisfied the stringent requirements for a patent, appellate
courts recognized a correspondingly broad patent scope so that the
patent effectively excluded most would-be competitors. At a purely
subjective level, the single resolution most representative of this era
was a finding by the district court (usually after a bench trial) that the
patent was invalid, but if valid, infringed, subsequently affirmed on
appeal on the grounds of patent invalidity. In contrast to this tradi-
tional approach, the Federal Circuit has made it far easier for a patent
holder to repel challenges 33 to her patent's validity. By eviscerating
the nonobviousness requirement, the Federal Circuit has substan-
tially reduced the level of creativity required to establish a valid pat-
3' Some cases involved multiple infringement claims, some of which failed due to
invalidity and some of which failed due to an inability to establish infringement. The
percentages in Figures 2 and 3 do not therefore necessarily sum to one.
32 As I have explained elsewhere, one of the principal costs to a patent holder of
bringing an infringement action is the possibility that her patent will be declared in-
valid. Because the Federal Circuit has sharply reduced the chance of such a result, pat-
ent holders may find infringement claims with objectively smaller chances of succeed-
ing on the infringement element. Lunney, 7 Mich Telecommun & Tech L Rev 363 at 374
n.43, 384 (cited in note 16). This may account for some of the increase in the percent-
ages of failed claims that fail due to an inability to establish that the allegedly infring-
ing device or process falls within the patent's right to exclude, both directly and by re-
ducing the asymmetric stakes otherwise present where the patent holder faces a
significant chance of patent invalidity. Nevertheless, given the magnitude of the
change in non-infringement results and the expense entailed in patent litigation, it
seems unlikely that patent holders' decisions to begin bringing relatively weak in-
fringement claims accounts for much of the changes in failure results reflected in Fig-
ures 2 and 3.
33 Although the phrasing "repel challenges" may seem curious, under the Patent
Act of 1952, a patent, once issued, is presumed valid. 35 USC § 282 (2002). Therefore,
the burden is on the alleged infringer to prove the patent invalid. See id. As a result, a
patent holder need not prove her patent valid. A patent holder need only repel those
challenges to her patent's validity that the alleged infringer raises.
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ent. At the same time, while the Federal Circuit has routinely upheld
patents even for minor advances, the Federal Circuit has also limited
patents to a correspondingly narrow scope. Again, at a purely subjec-
tive level, the single resolution most representative of the Federal
Circuit era was a ruling, as a matter of law, that the patent was valid,
but not infringed.
III. EXPLAINING THE STATISTICS:
DOCTRINAL CHANGES UNDER THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
When we look beyond the statistics, we find a number of doctrinal
changes that have driven this shift towards narrower, but more read-
ily valid, patents. We begin with the doctrinal changes that the Fed-
eral Circuit has made with respect to validity, before moving to the
doctrinal changes the Federal Circuit and the Court have made with
respect to infringement.
A. The Federal Circuit's Doctrinal Changes to the Validity Inquiry
and the Court's Silent Acquiescence
The formal statutory requirements for obtaining a patent have re-
mained essentially unchanged since the enactment of the Patent Act
of 1952. In order to obtain a valid patent, an individual must invent a
"useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" 34
that represents a noveP5 and nonobvious 36 advance over existing tech-
nology (or "prior art"). In addition, the inventor must also file a pat-
ent application before the invention has been on sale, in public use,
patented, or described in a printed publication for one year.37 The pat-
ent application must describe the invention in sufficient detail to en-
able a person of ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention
without undue experimentation and "shall conclude with one or
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the in-
vention. ' 38 After the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") has ex-
amined the application and determined that it satisfies the require-
ments of the Patent Act, a patent will issue.39 Once issued, a patent
is presumed valid4° and, in any subsequent litigation, the burden of
34 35 USC § 101 (2003).
,1135 Usc § 102(a) (2003).
36 35 USC § 103 (2003).
37 35 USC § 102(b) (2003).
3835 USC § 112, -U 2 (2003).
3935 USC §§ 131, 151 (2003).
40 35 USC § 282 (2003).
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proof is on the alleged infringer to establish, by clear and convincing
evidence, the patent's invalidity.
1
Yet, if the formal statutory requirements have remained un-
changed, the Federal Circuit has used its exclusive jurisdiction over
patent appeals to re-interpret some of these statutory requirements
to ensure more readily the validity of litigated patents. Of these doc-
trinal changes, two appear most significant to the sharp reduction in
invalidity results reflected in Figure 2.
First, the Federal Circuit has relentlessly enforced the presumption
of validity for issued patents. For example, before the Federal Circuit's
advent, courts had weakened the presumption of validity where an al-
leged infringer presented evidence of prior art that was not before the
PTO when the patent issued. Where the pertinent prior art was not
presented to the PTO, there would seem to be no basis for deferring
to the PTO and its acknowledged technical expertise. As a result, be-
fore the Federal Circuit's advent, courts stated that "even one prior
art reference not considered by the Patent Office can suffice to over-
throw the presumption. ' 42 While the burden of persuasion remained
on the alleged infringer to demonstrate invalidity, the quantum of
proof required to demonstrate invalidity became "less stringent."'
4
After assuming the exclusive responsibility for patent appeals, the
Federal Circuit moved quickly to reject any weakening of the pre-
sumption of validity. In 1983, in American Hoist & Derrick Co. v.
Sowa & Sons, Inc.,44 the Federal Circuit acknowledged that there was
"no reason to defer to the PTO" once an alleged infringer introduced
evidence of prior art not considered by the PTO. "But," the court con-
tinued, such evidence "has no effect on the presumption [of validity]
or on who has the burden of proof "'"4 Nor "does the standard of proof
41 See, e.g., American Hoist & Derrick Co v Sowa & Sons, Inc, 725 F2d 1350 (Fed
Cir 1983); Stratoflex, Inc vAeroquip Corp, 713 F2d 1530, 1534 (Fed Cir 1983).
42 Henry Mfg Co v Commercial Filters Corp, 489 F2d 1008,1013 (7th Cir 1972); see
also Baumstimler v Rankin, 677 F2d 1061, 1066 (5th Cir 1982).
43 Dickey-John Corp v Intl Tapetronics Corp, 710 F2d 329, 337 (7th Cir 1983). As
the Fifth Circuit explained:
Where the validity of a patent is challenged for failure to consider prior art, the
bases for the presumption of validity, the acknowledged experience and expert-
ise of the Patent Office personnel and the recognition that patent approval is a
species of administrative determination supported by evidence, no longer exist
and thus the challenger of the validity of the patent need no longer bear the
heavy burden of establishing invalidity either "beyond a reasonable doubt" or
"by clear and convincing evidence!'
Baumstimler v Rankin, 677 F2d 1061, 1066 (5th Cir 1982).
" 725 F2d 1350 (Fed Cir 1983).
4s American Hoist & Derrick Co, 725 F2d at 1359-60.
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change."46 While evidence of prior art that the PTO did not consider
can establish a patent's invalidity, the burden remained on the chal-
lenger to establish invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.4"
Second, in addition to relentlessly enforcing the presumption of
validity, the Federal Circuit has also reduced sharply the extent of the
technological advance required to sustain a patent. Under sections
102(a) and 103 of the Patent Act,48 an invention must represent a novel
and nonobvious advance over the prior art. Under section 102(a), an
invention is new or novel unless "all of the elements and limitations
of the claim are found within a single prior art reference. '49 For the
prior art disclosure to anticipate a claimed invention, "[tlhere must
be no difference between the claimed invention and the reference dis-
closure, viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the field of inven-
tion."50 In contrast, under section 103, we ask whether the claimed
invention "would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the
art... in view of the teachings of the prior art as a whole."5' Because
the nonobviousness requirement compares the claimed invention to
the prior art as a whole, rather than to a single reference, and because
it can bar patentability even if there are differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art, nonobviousness has traditionally
represented the principal substantive hurdle for patentability This is
clearly reflected in our statistical analysis of appellate patent results.
As discussed, on its own, a failure to satisfy the nonobviousness re-
quirement accounted for 64.8 percent of the cases in our pre-Federal
Circuit sample where claims of patent infringement failed.
Application of the nonobviousness requirement in cases involving
so-called combination patents perhaps best reflected the stringency
of the requirement before the Federal Circuit's advent.5 2 Because we
determine nonobviousness against "the teachings of the prior art as
a whole,"5 3 if the prior art encompassed each element of a claimed in-
vention, then the prior art would seem to encompass the claimed in-
16 Id at 1360.; see also Stratoflex, Inc v Aeroquip Corp, 713 F2d 1530, 1534 (Fed
Cir 1983).
4 American Hoist & Derrick Co, 725 F2d at 1360.
8 35 USC § 103 (2003).
49 Scripps Clinic & Research Found v Genentech, Inc, 927 F2d 1565, 1576 (Fed Cir
1991) (citations omitted).
so Id.; see also Carella v Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co, 804 F2d 135, 138 (Fed
Cir 1986).
51 Stratoflex, Inc, 713 F2d 1530 at 1537.
52 See, e.g., Sakraida v Ag Pro, Inc, 425 US 273 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock v
Pavement Salvage Co, 396 US 57,61 (1969); Great A & P Tea Co v Supermarket Equip
Corp, 340 US 147 (1950).
13 Stratoflex, Inc, 713 F2d at 1537.
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vention as a whole. Perhaps for that reason, where a patent claimed a
combination of preexisting elements, with each element well-known
in the prior art, the Court would presume that the combination was
obvious. Only where the combination produced an unexpected or
"synergetic" result would the Court find that a combination of pre-
existing elements satisfied the nonobviousness requirement.5 4 For
example, in 1976, the Court considered the validity of a patent cov-
ering a water flush system to remove cow manure from the floor of a
dairy barn.55 Noting that the patent consisted of a combination of
preexisting elements, such as the storage of water in tanks or pools,
the Court held that the combination could not "properly be charac-
terized as synergistic" because it did not "'result in an effect greater
than the sum of the several effects taken separately' 5 6 "[Tihis patent
simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function
it had been known to perform... *,,s Although the Court acknowl-
edged that the patent holder's flush system "produc[ed] a desired re-
sult in a cheaper and faster way, and enjoy[ed] commercial success,"
these secondary considerations were not sufficient to demonstrate
nonobviousness. Because the claimed invention "'did not produce a
"new or different function,' .. the flush system lacked the requisite
synergy required for combination patents and was therefore obvious.58
Again, the Federal Circuit acted quickly, rejecting the Court's
"synergism" requirement for combination patents in another 1983
decision, Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.5 9 In refusing to follow
the Court's approach, Chief Judge Markey, writing for the panel,
stated that:
A requirement for "synergism" or a "synergistic effect" is
nowhere found in the statute.... The reference to a "combina-
tion patent" is equally without support in the statute.. . [and] is
moreover meaningless. Virtually all patents are "combination
patents," if by that label one intends to describe patents having
claims to inventions formed of a combination of elements.
60
54 See United States v Adams, 383 US 39 (1966) (ruling that patent was nonobvious
where combination of prior art elements "'wholly unexpectedly' has shown 'certain
valuable operating advantages over other batteries' while those from which it is
claimed to have been copied were long ago discarded").
55 Sakraida, 425 US at 280-81.
-6 Id at 282 (quoting Anderson's-Black Rock v Pavement Salvage Co, 397 US 57,
61(1969)).
57 Id
-8 Id at 282-83 (quoting Anderson's-Black Rock, 397 US at 60).
59 713 F2d 1530 (Fed Cir 1983) (Markey, Ch. J); see also Dreyfuss, 64 NYU L Rev at
9-10 (cited in note 12).
60 Stratoflex, Inc, 713 F2d at 1540.
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While Chief Judge Markey's assertion regarding the lack of express
statutory language is accurate, any number of patent law doctrines
derive from Court decisions without express statutory support, in-
cluding, for example, the clear and convincing evidence standard for
overcoming the presumption of validity6' and the experimental use
gloss on section 102(b)'s public use bar.62 Similarly, although his "vir-
tually all" assertion overstated the traditional applicability of the
combination patent doctrine, its general applicability was the point.
Given that nonobviousness is judged from the perspective of the prior
art as a whole, the ability to combine prior art references was and is
an integral aspect of the nonobviousness inquiry.
Having rejected the Court's presumption that different prior art
references can be freely combined for purposes of determining obvi-
ousness, the question becomes: When can references be combined?
Although the Stratoflex, Inc. panel rejected the Court's approach, it
did not articulate its own standard. That standard would come the
following year, in ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hospi-
tal, when the Federal Circuit stumbled 64 upon a formulation that
would substantially restrict the practice of combining prior art refer-
ences in order to establish a patented invention's obviousness. Under
the ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. panel's approach, prior art references
may be combined to demonstrate the obviousness of a patented in-
vention "only if there is some suggestion or incentive to do so" in the
prior art.65 Although the Federal Circuit has sometimes permitted
61 Although the Patent Act provides for a presumption of validity, 35 USC § 282
(2003), the Patent Act does not state that the presumption can be overcome only by
clear and convincing evidence. That evidentiary standard derives from the Court's de-
cisions in Coffin v Ogden, 85 US (18 Wall) 120, 124 (Oct term 1873), and The Barbed
Wire Patent, 143 US 275 (1892).
62 In City of Elizabeth vAmerican Nicholson Pavement Co, 97 US 126 (1877), the
Court considered whether the patent holder's use of a road paving method to construct
a toll road more than six years before he filed his patent application barred the patent
under the corresponding public use provision then in force. The Court held that be-
cause the inventor's use was "by way of experiment, and in order to bring the invention
to perfection," City of Elizabeth, 97 US at 134, it was not a public use within the mean-
ing of the statutory bar.
63 732 F2d 1572 (Fed Cir 1984).
64 Although the panel cited a handful of decisions in footnotes 13 and 14 of its opin-
ion as support for its statement of the "teaching or suggestion" test for combining ref-
erences, ACS Hospital Sys, Inc, 732 F2d at 1577 nn. 13, 14, none of the cited cases re-
cite or otherwise appear to support such a test. Whether the ACS Hospital Sys., Inc
panel intended to formulate a new test or was simply incapable of summarizing the
then-existing standards is unclear.
65 ACS Hospital Sys, Inc, 732 F2d at 1577. For more recent applications of the doc-
trine, see Robotic Vision Systems, Inc v View Eng'g, Inc, 189 F3d 1370, 1377 (Fed Cir
1999) ("The party seeking a holding of invalidity based on a combination of two or
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"implicit" suggestions to satisfy the standard, 66 the Federal Circuit's
approach reverses the key presumption in these cases. Where all of
the elements were known, the Court's "synergism" approach pre-
sumed that any given combination was obvious, unless there was
some reason that suggested otherwise. The Federal Circuit, on the
other hand, presumes that any given combination is nonobvious, un-
less there is some suggestion in the prior art otherwise.
In addition to rejecting the Court's approach to combining prior art
references, Chief Judge Markey was also dissatisfied with the Court's
approach to the so-called "secondary considerations." In Graham v.
John Deere Co., 67 the Court had acknowledged that "[sluch second-
ary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved
needs, failure of others, etc., ... may have relevancy" "as indicia of
obviousness or nonobviousness' 68 Nevertheless, while the Graham
Court stated that these factors "might be utilized," such secondary
considerations were insufficient in Graham itself to "tip the scales of
patentability" where the invention as whole otherwise appeared ob-
vious. 9 Until the advent of the Federal Circuit, the various circuits
universally read Graham as requiring obviousness to be determined
primarily based upon a three-part inquiry, consisting of: (1) defining
the prior art; (2) identifying the differences between the claimed in-
vention and the prior art; and (3) determining the level of ordinary
skill in the art; with the secondary considerations relegated to a sub-
sidiary role. In keeping with their reading of Graham, the various cir-
cuits consistently held that it was not reversible error for a trial court
more prior art teachings must show some motivation or suggestion to combine the
teachings."); Micro Chem, Inc v Great Plains Chem Co, Inc, 103 F3d 1538, 1546 (Fed
Cir 1997) ('A determination of obviousness must involve more than indiscriminately
combining prior art; a motivation or suggestion to combine must exist!) (citation
omitted); In re Laskowski, 871 F2d 115, 117 (Fed Cir 1989) (reversing PTO rejection of
patent application for band saw wheel because although prior art contained each ele-
ment set forth in the patent claims, the prior art did not contain any suggestion to com-
bine the elements in the manner set forth in the claims); see also In re Oetiker 977 F2d
1443 (Fed Cir 1992) (Nies, C. J., concurring) ("While there must be some teaching, rea-
son, suggestion, or motivation to combine existing elements to produce the claimed
device, it is not necessary that the cited references or prior art specifically suggest mak-
ing the combination:').
66 See, e.g., Riverwood Intl Corp. v Mead Corp., 212 F3d 1365, 1366 (Fed Cir 2000)
("In addition, where obviousness is based on particular prior art references, there must
be a showing of a suggestion or motivation to combine the teachings of those refer-
ences, though it need not be expressly stated.').
67383 US 1 (1966).
68 Graham v. John Deere, Co, 383 US 1, 17-18 (1966).
69 Id at 36; see also Sakraida v Ag Pro, Inc, 425 US 273, 282-83 (1976); Anderson's-
Black Rock v Pavement Salvage Co, 396 US 57, 60 (1969); Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co v Supermarket Corp, 340 US 147, 153 (1950).
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. 23
to fail to consider evidence of secondary considerations,70 and would
allow such evidence to "tip the scales" in favor of nonobviousness
only in close cases where the three-factor Graham inquiry "[did] not
produce a firm conclusion."7' Following these rules, the district court
in Stratoflex, Inc. made findings regarding the secondary considera-
tions, but did not include them in her analysis because she deter-
mined the invention as a whole to be obvious based upon the three-
part Graham inquiry.7 2 As the Court had stated in Sakraida: "Though
doubtless a matter of great convenience, producing a desired result in
a cheaper and faster way, and enjoying commercial success, . . . [t]hese
desirable benefits 'without invention will not make patentability.'" 
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On appeal, Chief Judge Markey refused to treat the secondary con-
siderations as secondary, insisting that evidence of secondary consid-
erations is often "the most probative and cogent evidence in the
record ' 74 and that it "must always when present be considered."7 5 Fol-
lowing Chief Judge Markey's lead, the Federal Circuit has held that
commercial success and the other secondary considerations, al-
though not conclusive on the issue of nonobviousness, 76 are a cen-
70 See, e.g., Stevenson v Grentec, Inc, 652 F2d 20, 23 (9th Cir 1970) (ruling that a
"failure to consider secondary factors [in determining obviousness] [was] not revers-
ible error").
71 Digitronics Corp. v New York Racing Ass'n, 553 F2d 740, 748-49 (2d Cir 1977);
see also Sakraida v Ag Pro, Inc, 425 US 273, 282-83 (1976) ("Though doubtless a mat-
ter of great convenience, producing a desired result in a cheaper and faster way, and en-
joying commercial success,... [tihese desirable benefits 'without invention will not
make patentability."') (quoting Great A&P Tea Co v Supermarket Equip Corp, 340 US
147, 153 (1950)); Medical Lab Automation, Inc v Labcon, Inc, 670 F2d 671, 675 (7th
Cir 1981).
72 See Stratoflex, Inc v Aeroquip Corp., 713 F2d 1530, 1539 (Fed Cir 1983).
1- Sakraida, 425 US at 282-83 (quoting Great A&P Tea Co v Supermarket Equip
Corp, 340 US 147, 153 (1950)); see also Medical Lab Automation, Inc v Labcon, Inc,
670 F2d 671,675 (7th Cir 1981).
14 Stratoflex, Inc 713 F2d at 1538-39.
7s Stratoflex, Inc vAeroquip Corp, 713 F2d 1530, 1538 (Fed Cir 1983); see also Sim-
mons Fastener Corp. v lllinois Tool Works, Inc, 739 F2d 1573 (Fed Cir 1984) (reversing
finding of obviousness for failure to consider evidence of secondary considerations);
WL Gore &Assocs. v Garlock, Inc, 721 F2d 1540, 1555 (Fed Cir 1983).
76 See Richardson-Vicks, Inc v Upjohn Co, 122 F3d 1476, 1481-84 (Fed Cir 1997)
(ruling that patented invention was obvious despite evidence of commercial success
and other secondary considerations); Motorola, Inc v Interdigital Technology Corp,
121 F3d 1461, 1472 (Fed Cir 1997) ("In reaching an obviousness determination, a trial
court may conclude that a patent claim is obvious, even in the light of strong objective
evidence tending to show non-obviousness."); BF Goodrich Co v Aircraft Braking Sys
Corp, 72 F3d 1577, 1583 (Fed Cir 1996) ("Considering the minor difference between the
claimed invention and the [prior art], the secondary considerations were not suffi-
ciently compelling" to preclude a conclusion of obviousness.); Newell Cos. v Kenney
Mfg Co, 864 F2d 757, 768-69 (Fed Cir 1988) (noting that secondary considerations
"must be considered, [but] they do not control the obviousness conclusion").
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tral, rather than secondary, factor in the obviousness inquiry.77 In
keeping with this more central role, the Federal Circuit has renamed
these considerations, preferring the label "objective evidence of
nonobviousness" rather than Graham's label of "secondary consid-
erations."7 s The Federal Circuit has also: (1) employed a broader range
of secondary considerations as proof of nonobviousness 79; (2) relaxed
the required showing that the commercial success was the result of
the nonobvious nature of the claimed invention, rather than some
other factor, such as marketing0 ; and (3) restricted attempts to use
secondary considerations (or the lack thereof) to establish that a pat-
ent was obvious.81
Like the Federal Circuit's substitution of its own suggestion test
for the Court's synergy approach, the Federal Circuit's increased re-
liance on secondary considerations tends to reduce directly the like-
lihood that a litigated patent will be found obvious. As Professor Ed-
mund Kitch warned more than thirty years ago, an increased reliance
on secondary considerations, such as commercial success, to resolve
questions of patent validity almost necessarily leads to a rule "that
all patents that are litigated should be held valid."82 As Professor
" See, e.g., Uniroyal, Inc v Rudkin-Wiley Corp, 837 F2d 1044 (Fed Cir) (reversing
district court's finding of obviousness for failing to give more weight to evidence of sec-
ondary considerations); Alco Standard Corp. v Tennessee Valley Authority, 808 F2d
1490, 1492, 1499-1501 (Fed Cir 1986) (holding patent nonobvious on basis of secondary
considerations despite the fact that the three-factor inquiry strongly suggested that pat-
ent was obvious in light of prior art). Indeed, the Federal Circuit has taken to identify-
ing secondary considerations as a fourth Graham factor. See, e.g., Robotic Vision Sys-
tems, Inc v View Eng'g, Inc, 189 F3d 1370, 1376 (Fed Cir 1999); Modine Mfg Co v Allen
Group, Inc, 917 F2d 538, 541 (Fed Cir 1990); Loctite Corp. v Ultraseal, Ltd, 781 F2d
861, 872-73 (Fed Cir 1985); Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v Con-Agra, Inc, 35 USPQ 2d
1278, (Fed Cir 1994) ("Obviousness is a question of law with four factual predicates").
78 See, e.g., Gillette Co v S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc, 919 F2d 720, 725 (Fed Cir 1990);
Modine Mfg., 917 F2d at 541.
71 See Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal Circuit's Patent Nonobviousness
Standards: Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 Nw U L
Revl051, 1071-72 (1991).
1o See, e.g., Merges, 76 Calif L Rev at 824-25 (cited in note 12).
81 Compare Graham,383 US at 18 (noting that secondary considerations "may have
relevancy" "as indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness"); with Gentry Gallery, Inc v
Berkline Corp, 134 F3d 1473, 1478 (Fed Cir 1998) (noting that evidence of secondary fac-
tors "can only further support nonobviousness") and Custom Accessories, Inc v Jeffrey-
Allan Indus, Inc, 807 F2d 955, 960 (Fed Cir 1986) (holding that absence of commercial
development or other secondary considerations is not evidence of obviousness, but only
"a neutral factor"). Compare Concrete Appliances Co v Gomery, 269 US 177, 185 (1925)
(relying on near-simultaneous invention by others to support ruling of obviousness)
and Fred Whitaker Co v E. T Barwick Indus, Inc, 551 F2d 622, 628 (5th Cir 1977); with
Environmental Designs, Ltd v Union Oil Co, 713 F2d 693, 698 (Fed Cir 1983) (ruling
that evidence of near-simultaneous invention by others not evidence of obviousness).
82 Edmund Kitch, Graham v John Deere Co: New Standards for Patents, 1966 S Ct
Rev 293.
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Kitch explained, "it is unlikely that patents that are not commer-
cially successful will be brought to litigation.''8 3 As a result, to the ex-
tent that commercial success becomes an important factor in deter-
mining a patent's validity, the very fact that the patent is worth
litigating should establish its validity
8 4
Despite the fact that the Federal Circuit has overlooked, rewritten,
and in some cases, expressly rejected the Court's interpretation of the
nonobviousness doctrine, the Court has so far refused all invitations
to reexamine the Federal Circuit's new nonobviousness doctrine. We
can attribute this in part to the Federal Circuit's practice of reserv-
ing its most outrageous overreaching for those cases where a certio-
rari petition is unlikely. In "reversing" Sakraida, for example, the
Stratoflex panel held that even under its substantially diminished
nonobviousness requirement, the patented invention was obvious.
By holding the patented invention obvious, the panel ensured that
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant had an incentive to petition
the Court for review: the defendant because it won; the plaintiff
because it could not persuasively argue that its patent would have
been valid if only the panel had applied the Court's more stringent
nonobviousness standards. Safely insulated from Court review, the
Stratoflex panel decision remained on the books and became binding
on later Federal Circuit panels.
More generally, even where the Federal Circuit has not expressly
rejected the Court's rulings, decisions of the Court have proven far
less binding on the Federal Circuit than they have on the other Cir-
cuits. Given its exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, the Federal
Circuit need not worry that another Circuit will reveal and ridicule
the Federal Circuit's "rewriting" of Court precedent." If circuit con-
flicts are an important signal to the Court in deciding which appel-
late decisions to review, then the absence of such "competition" may
have given the Federal Circuit correspondingly greater leeway to work
around seemingly binding Court authority
8 6
In any event, whatever the reason for the Court's silence on the ob-
viousness issue, the net result has been that nearly thirty years has
83 Id.
84 id.
85 The Court's decision in Holmes re-establishes the possibility of such competi-
tion. See Holmes Group, Inc v Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc, 535 US 826
(2002) (holding that the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals
only to the extent that the action for patent infringement appears in the complaint un-
der the well-pleaded complaint rule).
86 See Holmes Group, Inc, 535 US at 839 (Stevens, J, concurring) ('An occasional
conflict in decisions may be useful in identifying questions that merit this Court's
attention. Moreover, occasional decisions by courts with broader jurisdiction will
provide an antidote to the risk that the specialized court may develop an institu-
tional bias.")
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passed since the Court's last decision on nonobviousness, Sakraida,
and nearly forty years has passed since the Court's last decision that
retains any influence on the issue, Graham. Sooner or later the Court
will undoubtedly take up the issue again, but to date, the Court has,
through its silence, acquiesced to the changes the Federal Circuit has
made to the nonobviousness doctrine. Even under the Federal Cir-
cuit, the nonobvious requirement retains some semblance of life, as
it remains expressly present in section 103 of the Patent Act and
has continued to serve as a basis for finding a patent invalid in some
cases.87 However, it appears that nonobviousness's once dominant vi-
tality has been substantially diminished. Where before the Federal
Circuit's advent only substantial advances would satisfy the require-
ment, under the Federal Circuit, even slight advances over the prior
art will likely prove nonobvious. Both the statistics and the doctrinal
changes thus reflect a shift toward more routinely valid patents. In the
next section, we consider the doctrinal changes to the infringement
inquiry that have effectively narrowed the scope of existing patents.
B. Doctrinal Changes to the Infringement Inquiry: The Federal
Circuit Acts and the Court Responds
Of the three federal statutes generally considered part of intellectual
property, only one-the Patent Act of 1952-relies on written claims
to delineate the scope of the property protected. Under both the
Trademark Act of 1946 and the Copyright Act of 1976, we resolve
questions of infringement by comparing the allegedly infringing
trademark or work to the protected trademark or work of authorship
directly. Only in patent law do we resolve the infringement question
by comparing the allegedly infringing product or process to a written
claim that defines the patent holder's discovery. In patent law, where
the allegedly infringing product or process contains each element
written in the patent claim, we say that the patent "reads on," and is
therefore literally infringed by, the allegedly infringing product or
process. Where a patent holder cannot establish literal infringement,
a patent holder may nevertheless prevail if she can establish in-
fringement under the so-called doctrine of equivalents.
Formally recognized by the Court in Winans v. Denmead in its
December 1853 term,8 8 the doctrine of equivalents expands the scope
87 See, e.g., Georgia Pacific Corp v United States Gypsum Co, 195 F3d 1322 (Fed Cir
1999); Richardson-Vicks, Inc v Upjohn Co, 122 F3d 1476, 1481-84 (Fed Cir 1997) (rul-
ing that patented invention was obvious despite evidence of commercial success and
other secondary considerations); Motorola, Inc v Interdigital Tech Corp., 121 F3d 1461
(Fed Cir 1997); Para-Ordinance Mfg v SGS Importers Intl, 73 F3d 1085, (Fed Cir 1995).
88 Winans v Denmead, 56 US (15 How) 330 (Dec term 1853).
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of a patent beyond its literal terms. Under the doctrine, a patent will
extend to those products or processes, that while not literally covered
by the patent claims, have elements that perform the same function
in the same way to achieve the same result as each element set forth
in the patent claim. Although a firmly established part of patent law
for one hundred fifty years, the doctrine of equivalents has been
controversial from its inception. Setting the terms for a debate that
continues to this day, Justice Curtis, writing for the five member
majority in Winans, insisted that the "property of inventors would
be valueless ... if the public are at liberty to make substantial
copies of [the invention, merely by] varying its form and propor-
tions. '89 On the other side, Justice Campbell, writing for the four dis-
senters, countered that "[niothing, in the administration of [patent]
law, will be more mischievous, more productive of oppressive and
costly litigation, of exorbitant and unjust pretensions and vexatious
demands, more injurious to labor" than a failure to limit a patent to
its literal terms.90
Today, the debate over the doctrine of equivalents continues. On
the one side, the specter of the "unscrupulous copyist" who will du-
plicate an invention's substance while avoiding the patent's literal
terms-no matter how artfully drafted-cautions against restricting
a patent to its literal claims.91 On the other, the uncertainty and am-
biguity that the doctrine injects into the question of infringement
seem to contradict directly the statutory language requiring patent
applications "particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention."
92
Although the debate's substance has changed little over the years,
the outcome has subtly shifted in the last decade. While Justice
Campbell's arguments have not yet fully prevailed, judicial decisions
have increasingly recognized the persuasive force of Justice Camp-
bell's concerns and have therefore moved to narrow the doctrine of
equivalents. In this effort, the Federal Circuit, after a brief flirtation
with the doctrine, has led the way. Initially, in some of its first deci-
sions, the Federal Circuit embraced an expansive view of the doctrine
of equivalents, consistent with its pro-patent holder reputation.9 3 How-
ever, the Federal Circuit's enchantment with the doctrine soon faded,
89 Id at 342-43.
90 Id at 347 (Campbell, J, dissenting, with Chief Justice Taney, Justice Catron, and
Justice Daniel).
91 Graver Tank & Mfg Co v Linde Air Prods Co, 339 US 605, 607 (1950).
9235 USC § 112 (2002).
93 See, e.g., Martin v Barber, 755 F2d 1564 (Fed Cir 1985); Carman Indus., Inc v
Wahl, 724 F2d 932 (Fed Cir 1983); Hughes Aircraft Co v United States, 717 F2d 1351
(Fed Cir 1983).
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and by 1987, the balance of power on the Federal Circuit had shifted
towards a narrower view of the doctrine. In that year, the Federal Cir-
cuit, sitting en banc in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 94 re-
quired a patent holder to prove equivalency on an element-by-element
basis, rather than for the invention as a whole. By doing so, the Fed-
eral Circuit made it somewhat easier for the unscrupulous copyist
to duplicate the substance of a patented invention without infringing
the patent's claims.
To illustrate, consider the facts in Pennwalt. Pennwalt held a pat-
ent on a high-speed fruit sorting machine. Fruit was loaded onto a
conveyor belt, and as the fruit traveled along the conveyor belt, sen-
sors determined the weight and color of each piece. At the end of the
belt, the fruit was sorted according to either its weight or its weight
and color into the appropriate bin. To obtain its patent, Pennwalt
could not simply submit its fruit sorter, however. Rather, under the
Patent Act, Pennwalt had to draft a patent application "conclud[ing]
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming" its invention. 95 There are obvious difficulties in trying to
describe in words an invention such as a fruit sorter in a manner suf-
ficiently general to encompass potentially competing substitutes, yet
sufficiently precise to satisfy the statutory requirement. Neverthe-
less, given the statutory language, Pennwalt had little choice but to
make the attempt. Following the usual practice, Pennwalt included
in its patent a number of claims of varying specificity, with the hope
that should litigate result, at least one would be found both valid and
infringed.96 Although these claims vary, claim 10 is representative:
10. An automatic sorting apparatus comprising electronic
weighing means for generating a signal proportional to the
weight of an item to be sorted, first reference signal means for
providing a predetermined number of reference signals, the
value of each signal being established according to a predeter-
mined criteria, first comparison means for comparing the signal
generated by said electronic weighing means to the reference
signals provided by said first reference signals means, optical de-
tection means for generating a signal proportional to the color
of an item to be sorted, second reference signal means for pro-
viding a predetermined number of reference signals, the value of
91833 F2d 931 (Fed Cir 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 US 961 (1988).
95 35 USC § 112, 1 2 (2002).
96 Validity and infringement are resolved on a claim-by-claim basis. Each claim
is "presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims," 35 USC § 282
(2002), and a defendant need only infringe one claim of a patent to be guilty of patent
infringement.
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each signal being established according to a predetermined cri-
teria, second comparison means for comparing the signal gen-
erated by said optical detection means to the reference signals
provided by said second reference signals means, and generating
a signal therefrom, clock means for incrementally signaling
changes in the position of the item to be sorted, first position
indicating means responsive to a signal from said clock means
and said signal from said second comparison means for contin-
uously indicating the position of an item to be sorted while the
item is in transit between said optical detection means and said
electronic weighing means, second position indicating means
responsive to the signal from said clock means, the signal from
said first comparison means and said first position indicating
means for generating a signal continuously indicative of the po-
sition of an item to be sorted after said item has been weighed,
and discharge means responsive to the signal from said second
position indicating means for discharging the item at a prede-
termined one of a plurality of sorting positions.
For the sake of simplicity, we can break this claim down and sum-
marize it as a set of elements or limitations,97 as follows:
10. An automatic sorting apparatus comprising: (a) electronic
weighing means; (b) weight comparison means; (c) optical color
determining means; (d) color comparison means; (e) location-
indicating means; and (f) discharge means.
When Durand-Wayland began selling two different types of auto-
matic fruit sorting machines, Pennwalt sued for patent infringement.
Although both parties agreed "that the Durand-Wayland machines are
substantially the same as the machine described in the patent-in-suit
insofar as the results achieved," 98 there were some differences. Specif-
ically because Pennwalt developed its invention in the mid-1970s, it
relied on hard-wired electronics and analog voltage signals in its pat-
91 Although we can summarize the elements in this way for the sake of simplicity,
I should also note that the claim is drafted using means-plus-function language. Such
an approach is expressly authorized in the Patent Act. 35 USC § 112, 6 (2002). Al-
though such language seems facially quite broad, means-plus-function language does
not encompass every possible means to accomplish the specified result. Rather, the
Federal Circuit interprets such language "to cover the corresponding structure... de-
scribed in the specification and equivalents thereof." Intellicall, Inc v Phonometrics,
Inc, 952 F2d 1384 (Fed Cir 1992). For that reason, each of the elements in Pennwalt's
patent should be read to incorporate the specific structure (i.e. the physical circuitry)
that Pennwalt described in its patent for practicing the invention.
98 Pennwalt Corp. v Durand-Wayland, Inc, 225 USPQ 558 (N D Ga 1984), aff'd, 833
F2d 931 (Fed Cir 1987) (en banc).
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ented invention. Durand-Wayland's devices, on the other hand, were
developed in the 1980s and therefore used a general purpose micro-
processor programmed to operate the fruit sorting device. As a result,
where Pennwalt's invention kept track of the location of each piece of
fruit through an analog signal proportional to the fruit's physical dis-
tance along the conveyor, the Durand-Wayland devices kept track of
the location of a piece of fruit by its order in the fruit queue.
If the Federal Circuit had continued to evaluate the issue of equiv-
alency by comparing the patented invention and the allegedly in-
fringing device as a whole, there seems little doubt that Pennwalt
would have prevailed. Just four years before, the Federal Circuit had
held that patent infringement was established under the doctrine of
equivalents where a defendant "merely employed a modern day com-
puter to do indirectly what [the patent] taught it to do directly" 99 Yet,
four years later, applying the doctrine of equivalents on an element-
by-element basis, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's
finding that Durand-Wayland machines did not infringe Pennwalt's
patent either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. 00 Al-
though the Durand-Wayland devices kept track of each piece of fruit's
position on the conveyor, they did so using the fruit's place in line,
rather than its physical location along the conveyor. The courts con-
cluded that this was not the same "way" as Pennwalt's patented in-
vention. Because Durand-Wayland's devices lacked an equivalent of
element (e), the devices did not infringe Pennwalt's patent,'0 ' and
Durand-Wayland was therefore free to continuing selling its fruit
sorters in direct competition with Pennwalt.
Although Pennwalt filed a petition for certiorari, the Court refused
at that time to review the Federal Circuit's decision. 0 2 However, in
two more recent cases, the Court has affirmed the Federal Circuit's
vision of a narrower doctrine of equivalents. In the first, Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 03 the Court expressly
recognized that "the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly,
conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the
statutory claiming requirement." 1° Concerned that "the doctrine of
equivalents, as it has come to be applied since Graver Tank, has taken
on a life of its own, unbounded by the patent claims,' 0 5 the Court:
Hughes Aircraft Co v United States, 717 F2d 1351, 1364 (Fed Cir 1983).
100 Pennwalt Corp., 833 F2d at 933-39.
101 Id at 938-39.
102 Pennwalt Corp. v Durand-Wayland, Inc, 485 US 961 (1988) (denying petition
for certiorari).
520 US 17 (1997).
104 Warner-Jenkinson Co, 520 US at 29.
105 Id at 28-29.
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(i) embraced the Federal Circuit's element-by-element approach to
equivalency; and (ii) expressly recognized and broadened the reach of
the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel.
1 0 6
Classically in the law, where a party has made a representation
that another has relied upon, an estoppel will arise that will pre-
clude the party who has made the representation from subsequently
acting in a manner contrary to the representation. Courts justify
such an estoppel on the grounds that it would be unjust to allow a
party to retract a representation once another has reasonably relied
upon it. In patent law, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel
provides a similar rule: Where a patent holder has narrowed her pat-
ent claims during the application process, she may be estopped
from reclaiming the scope given up by her amendment. In essence,
the fact that a patent applicant has amended and narrowed her pat-
ent claims is taken as a factual statement or representation that the
applicant does not intend to claim those devices or processes that
fall within the broader claim language, but only those devices or
processes that fall within the narrowed claim language. Where an-
other party has relied upon that representation, by manufacturing or
using a device that falls just outside the narrower claim language, it
would seem similarly unjust to allow the patent holder to withdraw
her representation.
Although we can therefore fit prosecution history estoppel com-
fortably within the general rationale for estoppel, we should not take
a simple "representation plus reliance equals estoppel" formula
too far. After all, we could also say that every claim, whether or not
amended during prosecution, is a representation or statement of the
patent scope intended by the applicant. To the extent that another
party relies upon that representation, by making or using a device
that falls just outside the literal scope of the claims, one could make
a similar argument that an estoppel should arise. Although it ap-
proaches the issue from a slightly different perspective, such a gen-
eral "claim" estoppel argument merely restates the reasons Justice
Campbell offered for confining a patent's scope to its literal claims.
Having decided to retain the doctrine of equivalents, even if in a de-
cidedly narrower form, the Court has necessarily rejected this broader
form of the estoppel argument.
The question thus becomes why we apply prosecution history
estoppel, yet refuse to apply a general claim estoppel. Two reasons
likely justify our willingness to treat narrowing amendments as more
binding than we treat claim language generally. First, the fact of an
amendment almost necessarily reflects a patent holder's conscious
106 Id at 28-34.
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choice between the original and amended claim language. 17 More-
over, if the amendment was made during a patent's prosecution, there
will be a publicly-maintained record of the amendment, and we can
establish the nature of the choice made directly by comparing the
original and amended language. In contrast, where a claim has not
been expressly amended, it is less clear whether a deliberate choice
was made between a narrower and broader version of the claim. And
even if we believe that such choices are inevitably made by the patent
attorney in drafting the initial claim, there is no publicly-available
record of the nature of those choices. As a result, determining the na-
ture of the choice made and the broader scope foregone would prove
more difficult. In addition, because amendments are usually made in
response to feedback from the patent examiner and because amend-
ments are usually focused on a particular phrase or limitation within
a much longer claim, it is also possible that patent attorneys are
somewhat more careful in drafting claim amendments than they are
in drafting the claims generally. To the extent that narrowing amend-
ments reflect more deliberate, careful choices that publicly establish
a broader scope foregone and a narrower scope claimed, that might
justify treating a narrowing amendment, but not claim language gen-
erally, as a representation upon which others can reasonably rely.08
Second, limiting the doctrine of equivalents to instances where a
narrowing amendment has been made may be better tailored than a
general claim estoppel doctrine towards ensuring that a patent holder
cannot reclaim through the doctrine of equivalents subject matter to
which she is not legally entitled. For example, in Warner-Jenkinson
Co., the inventors had developed a filtration process for purification
of dyes.109 During the patent's prosecution, the Hilton Davis inven-
tors added the limitation "at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0" to
distinguish their filtration process from a previous patent that dis-
closed a similar filtration process at a pH above 9.0.110 Because this
prior patent either anticipated or rendered obvious the Hilton Davis
107 See, e.g., Festo Corp v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co, 535 US 722, 734-
35 (2002) ("[Where a narrowing amendment is made during prosecution,I the prosecu-
tion history has established that the inventor turned his attention to the subject mat-
ter in question, knew the words for both the broader and narrower claim, and affirma-
tively chose the latter."); Exhibit Supply Co v Ace Patents Corp, 315 US 126, 136-37
(1942) (noting that "by the amendment [the patent holder] recognized and emphasized
the difference between the two phrases. . . and the difference which [the patent holder]
thus disclaimed must be regarded as material").
10 See Festo Corp., 535 US at 740 ('A patent holder's decision to narrow his claim
through amendment may be presumed to be a general disclaimer of the territory be-
tween the original claim and the amended claim.").
109 Warner-Jenkinson Co, 520 US at 23.
110 Id at 22.
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filtration process for a pH above 9.0, the Hilton Davis inventors were
not entitled to a patent on their process for a pH above 9.0. To achieve
that result, the patent examiner required the Hilton Davis inventors
to amend their claim language to exclude the prior art literally. How-
ever, for that limitation to prove effective, we must also ensure that
Hilton Davis cannot recapture the prior art through the doctrine of
equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents already contains a limitation
prohibiting a patent holder from using the doctrine to expand a pat-
ent to reach products or processes previously found in the prior art,III
so the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is not essential to that
task. Nevertheless, prosecution history estoppel provides an addi-
tional basis for an alleged infringer to argue noninfringement-one
perhaps more readily understood by judges and juries than the tech-
nologically complex issue of whether any given equivalent was a part
of the prior art. Prosecution history estoppel can therefore serve to re-
inforce the boundaries of patentability. To the extent that narrowing
amendments implicate the boundaries of patentability more directly
than claim language generally, that might justify creating an estoppel
in response to such amendments, but not to claim language generally
Neither argument seems a particularly persuasive basis for treat-
ing narrowing amendments differently from general claim language.
While patent attorneys should act deliberately and carefully in
amending claim language, presumably they should also act deliber-
ately and carefully in drafting the initial claim language. Moreover,
patent attorneys draft the initial claims, just as much as amendments,
to ensure that the application satisfies the relevant legal rules. If we
need an estoppel argument as a backstop to the inherent limitations
on the doctrine of equivalents in order to safeguard the boundaries of
patentability in cases of amendment, it would seem that we would
need such a backstop just as much for unamended claim language.
Nevertheless, courts have applied prosecution history estoppel only
where the claims were narrowed during the prosecution of the patent.
Indeed, as the Court noted in Warner-Jenkinson Co., the Court had
historically applied prosecution history estoppel only in cases where
a narrowing amendment was "made to avoid the prior art, or other-
wise to address a specific concern-such as obviousness-that ar-
guably would have rendered the claimed subject matter unpatent-
able." 12 Under this approach, prosecution history estoppel would
plainly have barred Hilton Davis from using the doctrine of equiva-
lents to claim that its patent was infringed by another's use of the pro-
"I See, e.g., Pall Corp v Micron Separations, Inc, 66 F3d 1211, 1219 (Fed Cir 1995)
("[A] patent holder is estopped from recovering through equivalency that which was
deemed unpatentable in view of the prior art.").
"I Id at 30.
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cess at a pH above 9.0. The "9.0" pH limitation was added expressly
to overcome a prior art rejection. But under the traditional approach,
because the lower pH limitation was not added to avoid the prior art,
prosecution history estoppel would not so clearly apply.
On this issue, the Federal Circuit had held that prosecution his-
tory estoppel did not preclude Hilton Davis from asserting that
Warner-Jenkinson's use of the process at a pH of 5.0 constituted in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Finding no evidence in
the record as to the reason for the lower pH limit, the Federal Circuit
implicitly held that Warner-Jenkinson had failed to establish that the
amendment adding a lower pH limitation was made to avoid the prior
art. In the Federal Circuit's view, prosecution history estoppel did not
therefore apply, leaving Hilton Davis free to "assert[] equivalency to
processes such as Warner-Jenkinson's operating sometimes at a pH
below 6.'
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On appeal, the Court reversed. The Court held that where the rea-
son for a narrowing amendment was unclear, a rebuttable presump-
tion arose that the amendment was made for "a substantial reason re-
lated to patentability." 1 4 As a result, unless the patent holder could
demonstrate that the narrowing amendment was made for some
other reason, prosecution history estoppel would apply. Because
there was no evidence in the record regarding the reason Hilton Davis
added the lower pH limitation to its claim, the Court reversed and
remanded the case, presumably to offer Hilton Davis a chance to in-
troduce evidence regarding the reason for the lower pH limitation."5
Five years later, in the second recent case, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 116 the Court again granted certiorari
to review a Federal Circuit's decision on the doctrine of equivalents.
In Festo Corp., the Court addressed: (i) the reasons for an amendment
that would not give rise to prosecution history estoppel; and (ii) the
nature of the estoppel that would arise under prosecution history
estoppel. As discussed above, to obtain a patent, an inventor must
satisfy both the substantive requirements of sections 101, 102, and
103 with respect to the nature of the invention (novelty, nonobvious-
"3 Hilton Davis Chem. Co, 62 F3d at 1525.
"4 Warner-Jenkinson Co, 520 US at 33-34.
"s Warner-Jenkinson Co, 520 US at 33. Subsequently, in Festo Corp. v Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co, the Federal Circuit limited a patent holder to the rea-
sons for an amendment set forth in the patent's file wrapper. See Festo Corp., 234 F3d
558, 586 n.6 (Fed Cir 2000), vacated on other grounds, 535 US 722 (2002). As a result,
if a reason for an amendment unrelated to patentability did not appear in the file wrap-
per-and until the Festo decision, when a claim was amended for style or some other
reason unrelated to patentability, the patent attorney had no reason to include the rea-
son for the amendment in the file wrapper-the Warner-Jenkinson Co presumption
would apply.
116 535 US 722 (2002).
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ness, originality, and utility) as well as the procedural requirements
set forth in section 112 with respect to the form of the patent appli-
cation (enablement, best mode disclosure, definiteness). In its
Warner-Jenkinson Co. decision, the Court had expressly stated that
prosecution history estoppel would arise where a narrowing amend-
ment was made to satisfy a substantive requirement of patent pro-
tection, but did not expressly resolve whether prosecution history
estoppel would also arise for narrowing amendments made to satisfy
the procedural requirements of the Patent Act." 7 Sitting en banc, the
Federal Circuit ruled that prosecution history estoppel would arise if
an amendment were made for any reason related to patentability, in-
cluding compliance with section 112. Moreover, the Federal Circuit
further held that a patent holder was bound to the reasons given in
the patent's public prosecution history for the amendment and could
not offer extrinsic evidence on that issue.118 On these issues, the
Court affirmed.' 19 Unless an amendment was merely cosmetic, and
so did not narrow the patent's scope, prosecution history estoppel
would apply. 1
20
On the second issue-the nature of the estoppel created by a nar-
rowing amendment, the Federal Circuit ruled that prosecution his-
tory estoppel created a complete bar, prohibiting the application of the
doctrine of equivalents entirely to those claim elements that were nar-
rowed during prosecution in order to secure the grant of a patent.'
2'
Because claims are routinely amended and narrowed during patent
prosecution-that is in some sense the point of the dialogue between
examiner and applicant that constitutes patent prosecution-the
Federal Circuit's complete bar rule would likely have estopped many,
if not most, patent holders from 9laiming infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. As a practidal matter, the complete bar would
have substantially eliminated the doctrine of equivalents.
The Festo Corp. Court was not willing to go quite so far. Instead,
the Court held that prosecution history estoppel creates a flexible bar
"I Compare Warner-Jenkinson Co, 520 US at 32-33 (emphasizing that the Court
had applied the doctrine in cases where the amendment was "made to avoid the prior
art"), with id. at 33 (suggesting that patent holder cannot avoid presumption by intro-
ducing evidence that amendment was not made for "a substantial reason related to
patentability").
118 Festo Corp, 234 F3d at 586 n.6.
19 Festo Corp v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co, 535 US 722, 736-37 (2002)
("We agree with the Court of Appeals that a narrowing amendment made to satisfy any
requirement of the Patent Act may give rise to an estoppel.').
120 Festo Corp, 535 US at 737.
121 Festo Corp, 234 F3d 558, 569 (Fed Cir 2000) ("When a claim amendment creates
prosecution history estoppel with regard to a claim element, there is no range of equiv-
alents available for the amended claim element. Application of the doctrine of equiv-
alents to the claim element is completely barred."), vacated, 535 US 722 (2002).
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that leaves at least some room for patent holders to claim infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents even for those elements nar-
rowed during prosecution. 122 As examples, the Court suggested that
prosecution history estoppel would not preclude a patent holder from
establishing infringement under the doctrine of equivalents where:
The equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of the
application; the rationale underlying the amendment may bear
no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question;
or there may be some other reason suggesting that the patent
holder could not reasonably be expected to have described the
insubstantial substitute in question.l z3
Given these examples, Festo's flexible bar may not prove so flexible,
particularly given the central role that the Federal Circuit will play in
overseeing implementation of Festo's flexible bar mandate.
Taken together, the Court's doctrinal changes, by broadening the
reach of prosecution history estoppel and narrowing the doctrine of
equivalents, will likely reinforce the trend towards narrower patents
already evident under the Federal Circuit. Yet, Festo's more enduring
legacy is likely to come, not from the Court's specific doctrinal hold-
ings, but from the rationale it offered for the doctrine of equivalents
generally. Stepping away from (or perhaps merely unpacking the as-
sumptions behind) the doctrine of equivalent's traditional basis, the
Festo Court suggested that it is our imperfect command of language
that justifies the doctrine. As the Court explained: "[T]he nature of
language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a
patent application." 124 Although offered in an attempt to explain and
justify the doctrine's continued existence, the Court's justification
may, by that logic peculiar to lawyers and three-year olds, become a
limitation on the doctrine's application. If the inability to foresee
perfectly all the possible variations and minor substitutions through
which a competitor might duplicate the substance of an invention
without infringing its literal terms justifies the doctrine of equiva-
lents, then presumably the doctrine should not apply when the pat-
ent holder foresaw, or reasonably could have foreseen, the asserted
equivalent at issue-an approach the Court seemed to adopt directly
in cases of prosecution history estoppel.125 This foreseeability limita-
tion is not likely, however, to remain limited to cases involving pros-
ecution history estoppel. Because the Court offered the "language-is-
122 Festo Corp, 535 US at 737-41.
123 Id at 740-41.
124 Id at 731.
121 Id. at 741 ("The patentee must show that at the time of the amendment one
skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would
have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.").
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. 37
imperfect" justification for the doctrine of equivalents generally, the
Court's logic invites a similar foreseeability limit on the doctrine of
equivalents generally. 1
26
Under almost any plausible interpretation, the doctrine of equiva-
lents operates primarily127 within a relatively narrow range. In prac-
tice, it enables a patent holder to assert, and in some cases establish,
infringement where the allegedly infringing device falls between: (i)
what the patent holder actually claimed; and (ii) what the patent
holder could legally, and with perfect information and foresight
would, have claimed. 28 Although the doctrine's potential reach is
therefore inherently limited, the doctrine plays a critical role in en-
suring a patent's value as an exclusionary right because it covers pre-
cisely that area in which competitive, but potentially noninfringing,
substitutes are likely to develop. When it created the doctrine of
equivalents in Winans v. Denmead in 1853, the Court presumed that
the patent holder intended to claim essentially all of the area be-
tween what was and what could have been claimed, absent some ex-
press language to the contrary.2 9 In Warner-Jenkinson Co. and Festo
Corp., the Court has moved sharply towards reversing this presump-
tion and has placed the burden squarely on the patent holder to jus-
tify expanding a patent beyond its claim's literal terms. Although pat-
ent attorneys will undoubtedly respond to the Court's decisions by
adding additional claims and drafting existing claims more care-
fully, ° there will likely remain, given the limited time and limited
126 The Federal Circuit has already suggested such an approach. See Sage Prods, Inc
v Devon Indus, Inc, 126 F3d 1420, 1425 (Fed Cir 1997) (holding that a patent holder
cannot use the doctrine of equivalents to expand claim language to encompass fore-
seeable variations); see also Johnson & Johnson Assocs Inc v R.E. Serv Co, 285 F3d
1046, 1054-55 (Fed Cir 2002) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that subject matter dis-
closed but not claimed in a patent cannot infringe under the doctrine of equivalents).
127 The one exception is when the doctrine of equivalents extends a patent's scope
to encompass after-developed equivalents. Cf. Pennwalt Corp v Durand-Wayland,
Inc, 833 F2d 931, 938 (Fed Cir 1987) (en banc) ("The facts here do not involve later-
developed computer technology which should be deemed within the scope of the
claims to avoid the pirating of an invention.").
12, The hypothetical claim approach to the doctrine of equivalents reflects this view
of the doctrine of equivalents. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co v David Geoffrey & As-
soc, 904 F2d 677 (Fed Cir 1990).
129 Winans v Denmead, 56 US (15 How) 330, 343 (Dec term 1853) ('And, therefore,
the patent holder, having described his invention, and shown its principles, and
claimed it in that form which most perfectly embodies it, is, in contemplation of law,
deemed to claim every form in which his invention may be copied, unless he manifests
an intention to disclaim some of those forms.").
130 Given that the Federal Circuit began the trend towards narrowing patent claims
in the late 1980s, patent attorneys have likely already modified their patent applica-
tions accordingly. The available empirical evidence reflects an increase in the average
number of claims per issued patent over the last ten years, but whether that is a con-
scious response to Federal Circuit's infringement rulings is not clear.
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information available during a patent's drafting and prosecution, a
gap between what a patent actually claims and what the patent could
legally have claimed. Moreover, narrowing the doctrine of equiva-
lents gives would-be competitors a distinct advantage. In applying for
a patent, an applicant must attempt to guess how the market will de-
velop and then draft a patent that covers all of the forms competition
may take-a hard exercise generally made more difficult by the pat-
ent attorney's inevitable focus on the precise form of the invention
before her. In contrast, the would-be competitor knows how the mar-
ket and consumer preferences have developed. With the patent and its
prosecution history to study at her leisure, the would-be competitor
need only identify one means to introduce a competing product that
falls outside the patent's literal scope.1 3 ' Narrowing the doctrine of
equivalents will likely therefore narrow the effective scope of any
given patent.
C. Where Do We Go From Here: The Normative Desirability of
Narrower, But Routinely Valid Patents
Although not conclusive on their own, both the statistics and the
doctrinal revisions paint a compelling portrait of a switch from rarely
valid, but broadly enforced patents to routinely valid, but narrowly
enforced patents since the Federal Circuit's advent in 1982. Whether
this switch is likely "to promote the Progress ... of the Useful Arts"
is a more difficult question. Under the traditional economic ap-
proach, the costs of patent protection arise because the exclusivity of
patent rights is fundamentally incompatible with the nonrivalrous
consumption of information. Because of this tension between private
rights and public goods, establishing private rights over information
entails some societal loss (given the inevitable absence of perfect
price discrimination). Measured in the light of this traditional ap-
proach, the switch generates two, potentially offsetting, effects. On
the one hand, effectively eliminating the nonobviousness require-
ment may impose some social loss by granting patents to innovations
that would have been discovered and disclosed even without the in-
ducement of a patent. On the other hand, narrowing the scope of pat-
ent protection may yield societal benefits by reducing the scope of
patent exclusivity and reducing thereby the tension between a pat-
ent's private rights and the patented invention's public good character.
131 The analogy I sometimes use with my students is that relying on the literal
claims language alone to exclude would-be competitors is like playing poker where one
player (the "patent holder") has to show her hand to the other (the "would-be com-
petitor"). Although the patent holder in such a poker game may on occasion win a
hand through particular skill or luck, the game is anything but fair.
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Whether, on balance, the social losses within this framework will
outweigh the gains is unclear.
In an attempt to understand more clearly the economic conse-
quences of the switch, we will now examine an alternative approach
that focuses on the underlying economic structure of patent law.
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF PATENT
PROTECTION: THE COSTS OF UNIFORMITY
In order to limit the scope of our discussion, we begin with two as-
sumptions. First, even in the absence of exclusive rights to the intan-
gible information component of an innovative product, the private
market, operating against a background of property rights in tangible
things, will generate some incentives for innovation. 132 Nevertheless,
there may remain innovations that would be desirable, in that their
social value exceeds their social cost, yet unprofitable based upon the
rents available from tangible property rights alone. 133 Second, al-
though patents or copyrights are not the only mechanism available to
redress this gap between desirability and profitability,134 in some cir-
cumstances, a regime of exclusive rights in innovation will represent
the best available mechanism, given the information, agency, and
transaction costs otherwise present.
Even where patents or copyrights represent the best available al-
ternative for ensuring certain types of innovation, patents and copy-
rights are not an ideal solution. The intangible information compo-
nent of a work of authorship or an invention is characterized by
nonrivalrous consumption, or as Professor Paul Samuelson phrased
it, "one man's consumption does not reduce some other man's con-
sumption."135 Because the consumption of information is nonrival-
rous, there is an inherent tension between a private ownership regime
for information, and the concomitant right to exclude, and the infor-
mation's public good character. The sole purpose of private ownership
in this context is to permit the owner to exclude, or to threaten to ex-
132 1 will present formal models of the rents available from a lead-time advantage or
from a reputation for innovation in Part V. See text accompanying notes 167-171.
1-3 Although this gap between desirability and profitability is assumed for now, the
model presented in Part V will formally establish this gap. See text accompanying
notes 167-171.
134 Some of the alternatives include direct government financing through research
and development contracts, government buy-outs of patents, and prizes for innovation.
For a discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of these approaches, see,
for example, Wright, 73 Am Econ Rev 691 (cited in note 9); Kremer, 113 Quarterly J
Econ 1137 (cited in note 9); Scotchmer & Green, 21 Rand J Econ 131 (cited in note 9).
131 Paul Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 Rev Econ Stat 387,
387 (1954) (labeling such goods "collective consumption goods").
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clude, non-payors. The threat of exclusion allows the owner to sepa-
rate high and low reservation value consumers and to charge each
consumer some price for access to the information component of her
product. Inevitably, however, imperfect information and imperfect
contract enforceability will lead an owner to exclude some con-
sumers from access.136 Yet because consumption of information is
non-rivalrous, exclusion is never Pareto optimal.1 37 As Professor Ken-
neth Arrow has explained: "In a free enterprise economy, inventive
activity is supported by using the invention to create property rights;
precisely to the extent that it is successful, there is an underutiliza-
tion of the information."
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There is therefore a tension between private ownership and the
1
36 If individuals had perfect information regarding the preference structures of oth-
ers and contracts were perfectly and costlessly enforceable, a significant part of the jus-
tification for patent and copyright protection would disappear. With perfect informa-
tion and perfectly enforceable contracts, the creator of an innovative product could use
the threat that she will withhold access until the consumer agreed to enter into a con-
tract that would adequately safeguard the information component of her product. The
only gap left would be the one created by the risk of simultaneous, independent in-
vention. Even that risk could be addressed by relaxing the antitrust laws to permit such
simultaneous inventors to enter into binding contracts, dividing profits from their
joint market.
137 Professor Wendy Gordon has suggested that where a market price has been set
for a public good that effectively excludes consumers unwilling to pay the market
price, that is the ordinary operation of the market and hence not a market failure. See
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 Colum L Rev 1600, 1611-15 (1982). Such
an assertion fails to recognize the key difference between public and private goods. If
we were dealing with a private good, i.e. one characterized by rivalrous consumption,
such market price exclusion can be Pareto optimal. For example, if all markets are
complete and perfectly competitive, and the price of an apple was $1, there may be any
number of consumers who would like an apple, but who are unable to afford the mar-
ket price. However, if (as seems likely) apples are characterized by rivalrous consump-
tion, in order to provide an apple to one of these excluded consumers, we would have
to take an apple from one of the consumers willing to pay the market price. Because
the consumer from whom we take the redistributed apple would be worse off (under
the usual assumptions of self-interested utility), such a reallocation would not prove
Pareto optimal. (Moreover, because the consumer from whom we take the apple ap-
parently values it more highly than the otherwise excluded consumer to whom we give
the apple, the amount that the otherwise excluded consumer would pay for the apple
is insufficient to compensate the consumer from whom we take the apple for her loss.)
The market price exclusion associated with private goods can therefore prove Pareto
optimal. However, when we are dealing with public goods, the lack of rivalry means
that we can provide access to the public good to one of the consumers otherwise ex-
cluded by the market price of the good without taking that good from anyone else. As
a result, market price exclusion is not Pareto optimal for public goods.
138 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inven-
tion, in Bureau of National Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of Inventive
Activity 609, 617 (Princeton U, 1962).
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public good character of information. This tension may lead to wel-
fare losses where the market price for the public good excludes some
consumers from access. It may also lead to welfare losses where in-
formation asymmetries, transaction costs, the limits of practical
contract enforceability, or the potentially bilateral monopoly charac-
ter of the negotiations preclude an innovator from entering into an
otherwise desirable contract with another who wishes to build upon
or reuse the information component of a patented or copyrighted
product. This tension usually leads economists to suggest that deter-
mining the optimal scope of patent or copyright requires balancing
the benefits derived from the ex ante incentive effects of protection
against the costs that arise ex post from exclusion.'3 9 For example,
Landes and Posner assert that: "For copyright law to promote eco-
nomic efficiency, its principal legal doctrines must, at least approxi-
mately, maximize the benefits from creating additional works minus
both the losses from limiting access and the costs of administering
copyright protection.' 140 Others, following Arrow's formulation,
characterize the issue in terms of a trade-off between dynamic and
static efficiency.
Because of the tension between public goods and private rights,
even where patent protection represents the best available mecha-
nism for encouraging certain types of innovation, we should presum-
ably provide protection only if, and to the extent, necessary to ensure
each innovations expected profitability. Yet, historically, both patent
and copyright have not attempted to tailor protection to such an in-
dividually optimal level. Instead, both patent and copyright have pro-
vided more-or-less uniform protection to the full range of innovative
products that satisfy their more-or-less uniform sets of prerequisites.
Uniformity means that each innovative product that satisfies the pre-
requisites receives roughly the same protection. 4' It also means that
139 See Merges & Nelson, 90 Colum L Rev at 868 (cited in note 7) ("In most analy-
ses of the different aspects of the patent system, concern has centered on a simple
tradeoff. The analysis has concentrated on how changing patent coverage affects the
balance between incentives to the inventor and underuse of the invention due to pat-
ent monopolies.").
11o William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J Leg Stud 325, 326 (1989). Later in their article, Landes and Posner argue that
the "various doctrines of copyright law ... can be understood as attempts to promote
economic efficiency by balancing the effect of greater copyright protection-in en-
couraging the creation of new works by reducing copying-against the effect of less
protection-in encouraging the creation of new works by reducing the cost of creating
them." Id at 333.
"I' Within patent and copyright, courts often use the discretion inherent in statu-
tory language to provide somewhat more protection for certain types of creative prod-
ucts. For example, copyright protection for factual works, such as encyclopedias, or
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if we expand patent or copyright protection, we expand it uniformly
for all protected products. Because of this uniformity, when we ex-
pand patent or copyright protection, we expand it both to the innova-
tive products newly created in response to the expansion and to those
innovative products that would have been created even without the
expansion ("preexisting products"). 142 In terms of social welfare, the
additional products created in response to the expansion represent a
simple gain (at least, to the extent that a regime of exclusive rights
represents the best available alternative for ensuring the additional
innovation). Admittedly, given the tension between private property
and public goods, these additional products will be somewhat less
valuable to society than they would have been if they could have been
produced with no or less protection. 143 However, so long as these ad-
ditional products would not have been forthcoming but for the ex-
pansion in protection, society is still better off with these additional
products than without them (given the assumption that all other
markets are complete and perfectly competitive). On the other hand,
expanding protection to the preexisting products represents a pure
welfare loss. Because the creation of these products could have been
ensured with no or less protection, we cannot properly attribute any
useful works, such as computer programs, is generally less extensive than copyright
protection for fictional or entertaining works. In copyright law, this variation generates
the perverse result of providing the least protection and hence the least incentive for
the works we most need, precisely because we most need them. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lun-
ney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 Vand L Rev 483
(1996). By focusing exclusively on the ex ante costs of limiting access to a work, such
an approach is unlikely to ensure that copyright enables each author precisely to re-
cover her reservation cost. For the doctrinal elements courts use to incorporate vari-
ability into patent law, see text accompanying notes 175-184.
142 Please note the precise definition of "preexisting." Whether a product is preex-
isting for our purposes here is not a question of the timing of the innovation relative to
the timing of the expansion in patent or copyright protection. Rather, it refers to an in-
novative product that would have been created even in the absence of the expansion,
whether the expansion occurs before or after the creation of the innovative product at
issue. By defining "preexisting" in this manner, I intend to leave open the possibility,
alluded to by Ted Olson during oral argument in Eldred v Ashcroft, that an individual
devotes her resources to the creation of an innovative product in the expectation of a
future expansion in patent or copyright. While I do not find this possibility factually
plausible for the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, 1 am using a definition of pre-
existing that assumes that we can identify without error which works would have been
created without the expansion (or the expectation thereof) and which works would not
have been.
143 As Arrow has explained: "It is necessary to distinguish between the realized so-
cial benefit and the potential social benefit, which in this case, means the sale of the
product at postinvention cost, c'. Clearly, the social benefit always exceeds the realized
social benefit'" Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inven-
tion at 622 (cited in note 138).
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part of the value of these products to the expansion. Moreover, ex-
panding protection for the information component of the preexisting
products will limit the ability of others to take advantage of the lack
of rivalry that characterizes their consumption and will thereby de-
crease directly their social value. The key to evaluating the desirabil-
ity of expanded protection thus becomes a balancing of the value
gained from the additional creative output that broader protection
may ensure against the value lost from the reduced ability to exploit
the nonrivalrous character of the preexisting products.
We can model the costs that arise from uniform protection for-
mally We begin by defining the total surplus for innovative product i
as the sum of consumer and producer surplus for a particular level of
patent or copyright protection, X:
Si R) = Si(c) + Si(X)
An individual will devote her resources to the creation of innova-
tive product i so long as the expected producer surplus associated
with the product is greater than or equal to the individual's reserva-
tion price, which is assumed to be zero. Following the traditional
economic analysis of private rights and public goods, we will assume
that an increase in X will (over the range of potentially optimal 2.)44
increase the producer surplus, and decrease the consumer surplus, as-
sociated with each product i. Thus, a(Sc(X))/aX < 0 and a(SP(X))/X > 0.
Moreover, in the absence of perfect price discrimination, there will be
some slippage in the patent or copyright owner's ability to use the in-
creased protection to convert consumer surplus into producer sur-
plus. For that reason, the patent or copyright owner will be unable to
capture completely the consumer surplus lost as a result of the in-
creased protection. Increased protection will therefore lead to a loss
in the total surplus associated with any given innovative product,
thus a(Si(X))/DX < 0. We will finally assume N innovative products are
available, ranked in decreasing producer surplus order (for any given X)
4 As Professors Landes and Posner have explained:
N. measures the response of the number of works created to an increase in copy-
right protection. As we saw earlier, it can be either positive or negative. However,
when z [the level of copyright protection] is set optimally, N. will be positive.
For suppose that N. were negative at z*. Since the same level of N could be at-
tained at a lower z (because N increases initially and then falls as z rises), a lower
z would yield a higher level of W [social welfare]. Not only would [the total cost
of creating works] E(N, z) be lower (since it is a positive function just of z when
N is unchanged, and z would now be lower, but w (consumer and producer sur-
plus per work before deducting the cost of expression] would be higher at a lower
z for reasons explained in the previous section.
Landes & Posner, 18 J Leg Stud at 342 (cited in note 140).
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from 1 to N. Given these assumptions, we can now model: (i) the
optimal scheme of individually tailored patent protection; (ii) the op-
timal scheme of uniform patent protection; and (iii) the regulator's
endogenous choice between these two regimes and the degree of in-
dividual tailoring to include in the patent system.
Optimal Individually Tailored Protection. With perfect information
and costlessly enforceable legal rules, we could individually tailor
patent and copyright to each individual innovative product.' 45 With
such individually tailoring, the regulator would set Xi to maximize
the social welfare from each innovative product. For each innovative
product, the regulator would therefore solve:
Max Si(X,) = S (X,) + Sep(X) (1)
such that SiP > 0 (the innovator's individual rationality constraint).
To minimize the welfare losses that arise from the tension be-
tween private property and public goods, the regulator will set the op-
timal level of individual protection, X*, such that SP = 0. Substituting
SP = 0 into (1), the regulator will set k* to maximize both total and
consumer surplus (which in this case are the same) for each innova-
tive product. By necessity given the regulator's objective function,
St(k) > St(X*) with equality only for those products for which * = X*,
i.e., for the last product n produced under the uniform scheme of pro-
tection. In addition, with individualized protection, the regulator
will set X.* to ensure the existence of each innovative product for
which Sl(k* ) > 0. In other words, if the innovative product represents
the most valuable use of society's resources, then the regulator will
set X* to ensure its existence. As a result, so long as St(X*) > 0, the
regulator will set individualized protection levels ?,* to ensure the ex-
istence of the full range of innovative products, from 1 to N.
With individualized protection, social welfare thus becomes:
N
s I(X*) = (X *S ) (2)
Optimal Uniform Protection In contrast, with uniform protection,
X, applied to all innovative products, there will be some product n for
which the expected producer surplus exactly equals zero. For a given
145 Because some research paths prove ultimately unsuccessful, the rents available
from successful research paths must cover not only the costs of the successful path,
but also a share of the costs of the unsuccessful paths. A full consideration of this is-
sue is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, I have simply assumed that the govern-
ment actor has accounted for the risk involved in research in selecting the optimal
level of individualized protection.
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X, products 1 to n will generate a nonnegative expected producer sur-
plus and will be created. For a given X, products n + 1 to N will gen-
erate a negative expected producer surplus and will not be created.
Given this framework, social welfare at some initial level of pro-
tection, k, becomes the sum of the consumer and producer surplus for
the resulting innovative products, 1 to n:
S (X) = isRW (3)
Increasing protection from this initial level will reduce the total
surplus, but increase the producer surplus, associated with each in-
novative product. By ensuring a nonnegative expected producer sur-
plus for additional innovative products, increased protection will lead
to the production of additional products. If we consider the smallest
increase in protection, from ? to ', that shifts the break-even point
from product n to product n + 1, then at this new level of protection,
V, social welfare becomes:
n+1st( ' P " siw ) (4)
In order to determine the marginal effect of increased protec-
tion, we subtract (3) from (4). Simplifying, rearranging terms, and
solving for the optimal level of uniform protection by setting AS t = 0,
we obtain:
s =+j ?) [S,(X') - Si()] (5)
With uniform protection, the optimal level of uniform protection, k*,
is thus defined implicitly by (5) as the level of protection at which: (i)
the social welfare gained from the additional creative products broader
protection ensures; exactly equals (ii) the social welfare lost from pro-
tecting preexisting creative products more broadly than necessary.
We can therefore define the costs of uniformity, Cu, as the differ-
ence between social welfare with the optimal scheme of individual-
ized protection and social welfare with the optimal scheme of uni-
form protection:
N n
C = Si(,*) six*)(6)
1 1
We can rearrange (6) in order to separate the costs of uniformity
into two components:
N
Cu=, S,(X*) + [As,(Xp, X*)] (7)
n+1 1
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As (7) reveals, a uniform scheme of patent or copyright protection
imposes two types of costs. First, because uniformity requires the
regulator to consider the trade-off between encouraging additional in-
novative products and maximizing the social welfare associated with
the preexisting products, the regulator will set X* at a level too low to
ensure the expected profitability and hence the existence of innova-
tive goods, n + 1 to N. Even if goods n + 1 to N represent the most valu-
able use of the resources at issue, expanding a system of uniform pro-
tection to ensure these additional innovative goods' existence is too
costly given the restrictions such an expansion would place on ex-
ploitation of the preexisting innovative goods. With uniformity, soci-
ety therefore loses the surplus associated with these additional inno-
vative goods, as reflected in the first summation on the right-hand
side of (7). Second, a uniform protection scheme also over-protects
innovations 1 to n - 1, enabling the patent or copyright owner to
capture producer surplus strictly in excess of her reservation price.
Again, in the absence of perfect price discrimination, total surplus for
a given innovation, subject to the individual rationality constraint, is
maximized only when SP = 0. The total surplus associated with each
of the innovations 1 to n - 1 will therefore be lower under uniform
protection than under individualized protection. With uniformity, so-
ciety therefore also loses some part of the surplus associated with in-
novations 1 to n - 1,146 as reflected in the second summation on the
right-hand side of (7).
The Endogenous Choice Between Uniform and Individually Tai-
lored Protection. Given the costs of uniformity, the question arises
why we continue to provide more-or-less uniform patent and copy-
right protection. The answer likely lies in the information and ad-
ministrative costs that a system of individualized protection would
entail. In order to tailor protection to ensure that an innovator re-
ceived patent rights only if, and precisely to the extent, necessary to
ensure that the innovator received her reservation cost for the inno-
vation would require considerable information. If we tried to obtain
the necessary information directly from the would-be patent holder,
a moral hazard would arise. 147 The would-be patent holder would be
tempted to overstate both the social value of her innovation and her
146 Because X* = %* for innovation n, ASn(?L*, X*) = 0. It is therefore irrelevant whether
the second summation on the right-hand side of (7) runs from 1 to n - 1 or from 1 to n.
14" The moral hazard parallels the tendency to underestimate costs for government
defense projects in order to secure the contract to supply the project. See, e.g., A. W
Marshall & W H. Meckling, Predictability of the Costs, Time, and Success of Devel-
opment, in National Bureau of Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of Inven-
tive Activity 461, 470-75 (Princeton U, 1962).
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reservation price in order to secure a broad right of exclusion and the
associated rents. Moreover, because broader patent rights likely cor-
relate with increased rents, a menu of patent protection will likely
fail to separate effectively high- and low-reservation cost innovators.
Existing attempts to tailor patent protection to particular tech-
nologies tend therefore to reflect efforts to achieve uniformity, rather
than variation, in patent protection. For example, section 156 of the
Patent Act varies patent law's otherwise uniform twenty-year dura-
tion for a prescribed set of patents. Although section 156 might appear
initially to detract from patent law's uniformity, section 156 limits
the availability of these extensions to those products that require pre-
marketing regulatory approval.1 48 Where an extension is available,
section 156 further ties the length of the patent term extension to the
length of the regulatory review process. 149 By allowing inventors to
"recoup" the patent time during which regulatory approval was pend-
ing, and hence no commercial exploitation of the invention was pos-
sible, section 156 attempts to ensure that new drugs (and other prod-
ucts subject to FDA review) receive the same effective patent term as
products not subject to a similar regulatory approval process.
150
Moreover, even if we could overcome the information and admin-
istrative costs, a system of individualized protection would also en-
tail potentially substantial agency costs. The early history of patent
abuses by the English crown has cast a long shadow over patent law.
As the Court noted in Graham v. John Deere Co., s'5 the Patent and
Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution "was written
against the backdrop of the practices-eventually curtailed by the
Statute of Monopolies-of the Crown in granting monopolies to
court favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been en-
joyed by the public. 1 5 2 Although the English abuses are hundreds of
years in the past, they remain a stark reminder of the excessive
agency costs that a system of individualized protection may entail.
Even if the sort of readily visible excesses of the English crown are un-
likely in an open democracy, the uniformity of the patent and copy-
right systems likely remains an important bulwark against more
14835 USC §§ 156(a)(4), (f) (2002).
14935 USC § 156(c) (2002).
1-0 As discussed, an optimal system of individually tailored intellectual property
rights would leave each innovator with surplus exactly equal to her reservation price.
We should therefore expect innovators to oppose strenuously any attempt to institute
such an optimal system. On the other hand, innovators will happily support variations
to the existing uniform scheme that expand protections for innovations in their field,
whether or not such expansion is justified in terms of increased social welfare.
151 383 US 1 (1966).
152 Graham, 383 US at 5.
48 Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution
subtle agency-cost driven biases, particularly where Congress or an
administrative agency, rather than courts, 5 3 would be responsible for
individually tailoring protection.
1 4
Given these information and agency costs, a regulator seeking to
maximize social welfare has four alternatives. First, the regulator can
refuse to provide a system of exclusive rights for the innovative prod-
uct at issue. With such selection, welfare becomes:
W = Sp(nm) (8)
where W equals social welfare, S, is the social value of the innova-
tive products at issue, and nm is the number of innovative products
that the market, operating against a background of private rights in
tangible things, will ensure.
Second, the regulator could provide a uniform system of exclusive
rights for the innovative products at issue and make no effort to ex-
clude those innovative products that would be devised and disclosed
in the absence of such protection. Here, the regulator solves (6) to
identify X*. With such a uniform scheme of protection, social welfare
becomes:
W u = S (n(?,.*), A k) - E . (9)
where Ak. is the extent to which innovative products, 1 to n - 1, are
overprotected and E. is the information, agency, and transaction costs
such a uniform scheme of protection entails.
Third, the regulator could provide a uniform system of exclusive
rights for the innovative products at issue, but attempt to exclude
from protection entirely those innovative products that would have
been devised and disclosed in the absence of such protection. Here,
"3 Because federal judges are appointed for life, two of the principal means by which
bribes and other illegitimate forms of influence can be concealed, campaign contribu-
tions and promises of future employment, are not as readily available for influencing
federal judges. In addition, because the work of judges inevitably entails a written
record of decision open to the public, the shadows in which attempts at improper in-
fluence can flourish are not as deep with judicial decision-making. As a result, agency
costs likely are lower when judges, rather than other government agents, are respon-
sible for individually tailoring patent rights.
154 Even with uniform protection, these agency-cost biases can still influence the
shape of protection. Thus, copyright producers, because of their transaction cost and
collective action advantages over copyright consumers, have successfully persuaded
Congress to expand both the duration and scope of copyright protection far beyond
what can be rationally justified. However, if we took computer programs, factual
works, and other useful works of authorship out of the system and isolated entertain-
ing and fictional works within their own scheme of protection, there is every reason to
believe that the protection accorded entertaining and fictional works would be even
broader than it is today
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the regulator again solves (6) to identify -*, but by limiting the class
of preexisting products to which protection applies, the optimal level
of uniform protection will be higher. Thus, *e > X.* and n(k*e) > n(k*).
Moreover, if we assume that innovative products 1 to k would be de-
vised and disclosed even without exclusive rights in their intangible
information components, then such a scheme of protection will not
protect, and hence will not overprotect, goods 1 to k. However, at-
tempting to identify and exclude the preexisting innovative products
from protection will entail increased information, agency, and trans-
action costs; thus, Eue > Eu. With such an exclusionary, but otherwise
uniform scheme of protection, social welfare becomes:
Wu e = Sp(n(?*e), Aku.) - Eu (10)
Fourth and finally, the regulator could attempt to tailor protection
to the individually optimal level for each innovative product eligible
for protection. If we assume that the regulator can select any expen-
diture or cost level, e, in attempting to identify the precise reserva-
tion cost for each innovation and then to define and enforce a system
of individualized system of patent protection, we can generalize the
regulator's problem as follows:
Max W = S (nRAXj-e (11)
e
where W equals social welfare with such individually tailored pro-
tection, SP is the social value of all patentable innovations, given the
number of innovations created, n, and the difference for each innova-
tion between the actual level of patent protection received and the in-
dividually optimal protection level, AX. As the regulator increases e,
the regulator has better information and is better able to tailor pro-
tection for each innovation to its individual optimal. As e increases,
AXi falls (because protection is more closely tailored to the individu-
ally optimal) and n increases (because protection more closely tai-
lored to the individual optimal allows the regulator to set a higher
maximum level of protection).
Taking the first order condition for (11), the regulator therefore
chooses to expend effort e* to solve:
d w dSP dn dS, d(A?,)
1 0 = + (12)
de dn de d(Aki) de
In other words, the regulator expends effort e* to the point where the
additional information, agency, and transaction costs entailed in
more precisely tailoring the scope of protection to the individually
optimal levels exactly equals the marginal social benefit of that ad-
ditional effort in terms of: (1) the social value of additional innova-
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tions better tailored protection ensures; and (2) the increased social
value of preexisting innovations from more closely tailoring their
protection to their respective individually optimal levels.
After determining the socially optimal effort entailed in individu-
ally tailoring rights, the regulator implements the resulting scheme
of individually tailored rights and social welfare becomes:
W* = Sp(n(k*), Aki) - e* (13)
Having identified the welfare consequences of each of the four al-
ternative schemes of protection available, the question for the regu-
lator becomes which scheme maximizes social welfare for the par-
ticular class of innovative products at issue.
Consequences of Uniformity. Before using this analysis to evaluate
the switch to routinely valid, but narrowly enforced patents, the
costs of uniformity identifies several principles that, from an effi-
ciency perspective, should guide the structure of patent and copy-
right if we assume that the information and agency costs entailed in
individualized protection are prohibitive.15 - First, as discussed above,
if patent and copyright provide more or less uniform protection, pat-
ent and copyright should not provide protection sufficient to ensure
the expected profitability of the full range of innovative products eli-
gible for protection. Even where an innovative product represents the
most valuable use of available resources, we must balance the value
of an additional innovative product against the loss that arises from
broader protection of the preexisting products. For that reason, an op-
timal uniform scheme of protection will provide protection that will
115 We will revisit this assumption in Part VI. See text accompanying notes 172-183.
One alternative that may deserve further exploration would be an auction system for
patents. An auction system might provide an alternative to a system of government-
tailored individualized intellectual property rights. Specifically, the government could
"auction" a patent on a particular innovation to a party that agrees to develop the in-
novation within a particular time period. Would-be inventors could then bid for the
patent by stating the minimum patent term that each would accept in order to develop
the specified innovation. For example, in analyzing whether second-generation inno-
vations should receive their own patent, Suzanne Scotchmer has argued that ex ante
contracting between the holder of a patent on the first generation of a product and the
would-be developers of the second-generation innovations should usually provide an
appropriate incentive for the second-generation product. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Pro-
tecting Early Innovators: Should Second-Generation Products be Patentable?, 27
RAND J Econ 322 (1996). The difficulty with such an approach, both for second-
generation licensing and for an auction scheme more generally, lies in the uncertainty
associated with the inventive process. See, e.g., Marshall & Meckling, Predictability
of the Costs, Time, and Success of Development (cited in note 147). If we cannot pre-
dict ex ante the timing or costs of innovation, or even its nature, then both ex ante con-
tracting and an auction scheme are unlikely to function effectively.
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leave some desirable innovative products unprofitable. 5 6 This insight
may help explain the traditional exclusion from either patent or copy-
right protection of a variety of innovative products, including such
disparate products as business methods and clothing designs. Even if
providing patent or copyright protection would encourage the pro-
duction of additional desirable innovations in these fields, excluding
these fields from protection remains desirable so long as: (i) the in-
formation and other costs entailed in identifying and excluding the
preexisting innovative products in the field from protection would
prove prohibitive; and (ii) the resulting social cost from extending
protection to the preexisting products would exceed the social value
of the additional innovations that protection would generate.
Second, although we must be aware of potential information and
agency costs, we should remain alert for opportunities to limit uni-
formity costs by incorporating variation into an otherwise uniform
system of protection. 5 7 For example, if Congress were to expand pro-
tection by extending the duration of copyright or patent, Congress
could minimize the costs such a uniform expansion would impose by
limiting the term extension to those innovative products that would
not have been devised or disclosed but for the additional term. How-
ever, Congress is unlikely to have sufficient information to distin-
guish these innovative products from those that would have been cre-
ated even without the expansion. Nevertheless, even in the absence
of the information required to achieve such precise tailoring, Con-
gress could extend the term, but require the rights holder to satisfy
certain periodic formalities. The Patent Act embraces such an ap-
proach, providing a uniform term of twenty years from the date the
patent application was filed, but requiring the payment of mainte-
nance fees at three points to maintain the patent in force for the full
term.158 While such an approach does not strictly limit the duration
of protection to that necessary to ensure a given innovation (and is
not therefore an incentive compatible mechanism), at the very least,
16 This provides another reason why we should accord little weight to social rate of
return studies. By identifying innovative products just outside the margins of existing
protection with positive social rates of return, they do not establish a basis for ex-
panding patent or copyright protection. Rather, they are simply identifying an in-
evitable consequence of an optimal scheme of uniform protection.
157 For an exploration of how the nonobviousness doctrine, claims language, and the
doctrine of equivalents can introduce variation into otherwise uniform patent protec-
tion, see text accompanying notes 175-183.
158 Sections 41(b) and 154(a)(2) of the Patent Act incorporate such a requirement. In
order to receive the full twenty-year term, a patent holder must pay maintenance fees
on or before (or within a six month grace period) 3 years and 6 months after grant of the
patent, 7 years and 6 months after grant, and 11 years and 6 months after grant. 35 USC
§§ 41(b), 154(a)(2) (2003).
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it ensures that protection will end once the expected rents from an
additional term of protection for a particular innovation exceed the
costs of applying for the extension. For a given patent term, s9 such an
approach should tend to reduce (somewhat)160 the costs of an other-
wise uniform patent term, without undermining significantly the in-
centive to innovate.
1 6'
Third, and most importantly, to minimize the costs of uniformity,
we should limit application of a uniform system of IPRs to "similar"
innovative products. Innovative products are "similar" to the extent
that: (1) a given set of uniform prerequisites defines when a signifi-
cant gap will arise between the desirability of an innovative product
(relative to alternate uses of the resources) and its expected prof-
itability; and (2) a given set of uniform exclusive rights approximates
the protection precisely necessary to close that gap. As (7) reflects,
the costs of uniformity increase to the extent that the optimal level
of uniform protection, X*, differs from the optimal level of individual
protection, X*, for each of the innovations, i = 1, N, eligible for pro-
tection under a particular system of intellectual property rights
("IPRs"). On the other hand, the costs of uniformity tend to decrease
as X* approaches X ' for each of the eligible innovative goods. In the ex-
ceptional case, where X' = Xu for all of the innovations eligible for pro-
tection, the costs of uniformity would be zero.
While both patent and copyright cover a sufficiently wide range
of innovative products that X* is unlikely to equal X* for the full
range of innovative products eligible for protection, patent and copy-
1'9 This assumption is important. If the use of such formalities becomes a justifica-
tion for longer terms of protection, the question becomes more complex. The formal-
ities would still entail some cost savings by removing those products for which the
rights holder sees little or no commercial value from intellectual property protection.
However, some innovative products that would have been created even with the
shorter term may nonetheless remain commercially value for the longer term. As a re-
sult, the rights holder would comply with the formalities to preserve protection for
such an innovative product, tying down access to the product's information compo-
nent for a longer time than necessary to ensure the innovative product's existence. In
short, because formalities leave the decision to extend protection to the rights holder,
they are not well-tailored to minimizing the social costs of a longer term of protection.
While such formalities are desirable for a given term of protection, they should not be-
come a justification for a longer term of protection.
160 Because patent holders will allow only a patent to expire only where the costs of
renewal exceed the expected value of the patent rents, we should expect failures to re-
new only for the least valuable patents. To the extent that a patented innovation has
such trivial economic value, the social costs of extending protection are also likely to
prove trivial. (Recall that we have postulated the social costs of protection are some
fraction of the unrestricted social value.)
161 See Francesca Cornelli & Mark Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D In-
centives, 30 RAND J Econ 197 (1999); Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Optimality of the
Patent Renewal System, 30 RAND J Econ 181 (1999).
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right historically were each tailored to redress a specific desirability-
profitability gap. For example, copyright, at least for its first hundred
years, focused on the desirability-profitability gap that would other-
wise arise for innovative products subject to rapid and inexpensive
mechanical copying. By prohibiting mechanical or near-mechanical
duplication, copyright sought to narrow the desirability-profitability
gap for such works. At the same time, however, copyright limited the
costs that would arise from such protection in two ways. First, copy-
right strictly limited eligible subject matter to the types of innovative
products particularly susceptible to such copying. The Copyright Act
of 1790, for example, limited copyright protection to "maps, charts,
and books"-the types of innovative products particularly susceptible
to rapid and inexpensive mechanical duplication given the technology
available (i.e. the printing press) at that time.' 62 Second, nineteenth
century copyright also strictly limited the scope of protection avail-
able, granting an author the exclusive right "to multiply copies," but
leaving others free to build upon, translate, and otherwise reuse the
work.' 63 By narrowly defining the innovative products eligible for
copyright protection and by limiting the scope of protection provided,
copyright historically tended to remedy the desirability-profitability
gap mechanical duplication would otherwise create without impos-
ing undue costs. Unfortunately, over the course of the twentieth cen-
tury, that sensible focus, and copyright's consequential efficiency in
encouraging the creation of additional innovative products without
unduly restricting the use of preexisting products, has been lost.
From the outset, patent law has taken a slightly different approach.
Unlike copyright law, patent law defines the subject matter eligible
for its protection broadly, encompassing any "machine, manufacture,
process, or composition of matter."' 64 Patent also defines its scope of
protection broadly, prohibiting another from "making, using, selling,
or offering to sell" the patented invention. Unlike copyright law, pat-
ent law not only prohibits another's copying, it also prohibits another
who has developed the same innovative product entirely independ-
ently from making, using, or selling it. 6 Rather than rely on a narrow
162 See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
16 See, e.g., Perris v Hexamer, 99 US 674, 675-76 (1878) (defining copyright as "the
exclusive right of multiplying copies of what he has written or printed"); accord
Greene v Bishop, 10 F Cas 1128, 1133-34 (D Mass 1858) (No 5,762).
164 35 USC § 101 (2003).
165 Although copyright today has become far longer in duration than patent, patent
and copyright initially had similar durations. Compare Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch.7, § 1,
1 Stat 109 (authorizing patents with term of fourteen years), with Act of May 31, 1790,
ch 15, § 1, 1 Stat 124, 124 (authorizing copyrights with initial term of fourteen years
followed by a renewal term of an additional fourteen years if the author was still living
and satisfied the renewal formalities).
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subject matter or a narrow scope of protection to limit its uniformity
costs, 166 patent law has instead relied on a strict nonobviousness re-
quirement. Where a copyright requires only originality-essentially a
requirement that the innovative product be the author's own work-
a patent requires nonobviousness. To satisfy this requirement, a pat-
ent applicant has to demonstrate not only that the invention at issue
was his own, but also represented a significant advance over the work
of others. Unlike copyright law, patent law thus attempts to limit the
costs its protection would otherwise impose by limiting patents to
those innovations that reflect a substantial technical advance.
Figure 4 summarizes the respective combinations of eligible sub-
ject matter, level of creativity required for protection, and scope of pro-
tection historically associated with copyright and patent protection.








Figure 4. Traditional Balancing of Creativity Required and Scope of Protected Sub-
ject Matter Against Scope of Protection Provided
"I See, e.g., Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303,309 (1980). ("The Committee Re-
ports accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject
matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man.' S. Rep No 1979, 82d
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Through its modifications to patent law, the Federal Circuit, with
sometimes the acquiescence of the Court and sometimes its support,
seems determined to push patent protection from the lower right
quadrant towards the upper left quadrant-the traditional purview of
copyright law. Although both the traditional and Federal Circuit ap-
proaches implicitly recognize the costs of uniformity, they do so from
diametrically opposed perspectives. Because the traditional approach
provides broad protection, limiting the costs of such broad protection
(uniformly provided) requires strict limits on the availability of such
protection-hence an interpretation of the nonobviousness doctrine
that limits protection to the most creative technical advances. In con-
trast, the Federal Circuit's approach offers protection even to minor
technical advances. Because protection is widely available, limiting
the costs of such widely available protection (uniformly provided) re-
quires strictly limiting the scope or extent of protection provided-
hence the narrow interpretation of the doctrine of equivalents. Fo-
cusing on the costs of uniformity, within the structure of patent law,
thus suggest that we should not evaluate the changes to the nonob-
viousness doctrine and the doctrine of equivalents independently, but
as a package. Changing the ease with which protection may be ob-
tained dictates a corresponding need to change the scope of protec-
tion and vice versa. Because it recognizes this trade-off, a switch to
routinely valid, but narrowly enforced patents is almost certainly
preferable to a switch to routinely valid patents, broadly enforced or
to rarely valid patents, narrowly enforced.
As between the upper left quadrant and the lower right quadrant,
the question becomes which quadrant better corresponds to the de-
sirability-profitability gap likely to arise for innovations eligible for
patent protection. Through the nature of protection provided, each
approach suggests implicitly the desirability-profitability gap that
it is attempting to address. The traditional approach suggests that
there is a desirability-profitability gap for unusually creative products,
which gap requires a fairly broad scope of protection to redress.
The Federal Circuit's approach suggests that there is a desirability-
profitability gap for routinely creative products, which gap requires a
relatively narrow scope of protection to redress. In order to explore
which of these approaches has correctly identified the relevant gap,
the next section presents formal models of the rents available to en-
courage innovation in the absence of patent protection. Depending
upon where these models suggest the relevant gap between desirabil-
ity and expected profitability is likely to arise, we can determine
whether (i) the Federal Circuit's approach of providing narrow patents
for all advances or (ii) the traditional approach of providing broader
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patents, but only for exceptional advances, is better tailored "to pro-
mote the Progress of the useful Arts."
V. IDENTIFYING THE RELEVANT
DESIRABILITY-PROFITABILITY GAP
In the absence of patent protection, private rights in tangible prop-
erty alone will provide two types of incentive for innovation. First,
in the almost certain absence of perfect competition, an individual
who introduces a discrete innovation into the market will have some
time where she faces competition only from the range of preexisting
products available. Precisely to the extent that consumers consider
her innovation a desirable improvement over the preexisting prod-
ucts, an innovator will enjoy some market power and a correspond-
ing ability to price the tangible goods embodying her innovation
above marginal cost. Sooner or later, however, this lead-time period
will end. It may end when competitors notice the innovator's rents
and copy the innovation in an effort to obtain a share of the rents for
themselves. It may also end if another, working entirely independ-
ently, happens to re-create the same innovation and bring it to the
market shortly after the innovator. These new entrants will usually
offer products that consumers consider closer substitutes for the
original than the preexisting range of products, and will therefore
usually reduce the extent to which an innovator can price her prod-
uct above marginal cost in the post-entry period. Nevertheless, par-
ticularly in an oligopolistic market, prices for the innovative product
are unlikely to fall to marginal cost. Product differentiation, tacit col-
lusion, and a variety of other strategies will tend to ensure that the
innovator continues to earn some rents even after competitive entry
has occurred.
The second type of incentive arises not from the introduction of a
single innovation, but from an innovator's repeated introduction of
innovations over time. In many industries, consumers will lack per-
fect information regarding product quality. If consumers desire a
product at the industry's creative edge, but lack perfect information
both as to where that creative edge lies and as to which products fall
along it, a company, by maintaining a consistently innovative product
line, may establish a reputation as an innovator. A consumer would
not therefore need to know the current state of running shoe tech-
nology, clothing design, or the latest mathematical advances in port-
folio diversification theory to find innovative products. Instead, she
could simply turn to a company with a reputation for innovation
in those fields. Once developed, a reputation for innovation would
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become both a source of rents for, and an informal guarantee of, fu-
ture innovation. 1
67
The following sections model formally each of these sources for
innovation rents.
A. Innovation Rents in the Absence of Patent Protection: Lead-
Time Rents
The first source of innovation rents available in the absence of patent
protection arises from the lead-time advantage usually available to
innovators. If we assume that consumers can identify an innovative
product or service when it is introduced and consumers find a partic-
ular innovation desirable, an innovator will be able to charge some-
what more for her product until such time as a competitor either
copies or independently re-creates a similarly innovative product. As
such competitors enter the market, both the price our innovator can
charge for the original and her share of the innovations market will
steadily fall.
As a result of declining price and market share, we should expect
the lead-time rents available to decrease steadily (more or less) over
time, allowing us to model the lead-time rents using geometric decay
beginning from some initial price, p:
R i f 85tpe-ltdt (14)
ti
In equation (14), ti represents the time at which the innovation is
first introduced, 5 is a discount factor, and q is an increasing function
of the number of independent re-creators, N, and the number of
copiers, N., that enter the market. Both Ni and N, are determined en-
dogenously. We will assume that additional independent re-creators
and additional copiers will continue to enter the market until the ex-
pected rents available to each precisely equal their respective costs of
entering the market.
If we assume that all of the independent innovators are equally ef-
ficient at innovating, then the lead-time rents available to each are
identical as are the costs of innovating. Additional independent in-
novators will therefore continue to enter the market until the lead-
time rents available (as defined in (14)) exactly equal the cost of in-
novation, or until Ri = C1.
167 If we define a product's innovativeness as the relevant quality that consumers are
seeking, this result is suggested by Klein and Leffler's analysis. See Benjamin Klein and
Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89
J Pol Econ 615 (1981).
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Copiers must wait until after an innovation is introduced before
beginning the imitation process. The rents (or quasi-rents since they
are going to earn zero profit) available therefore begin at some time t.,
rather than at time ti, where t. > ti. If we assume further that con-
sumers consider the products offered by innovators and imitators to
be perfect substitutes for each other, then the rents available for imi-
tation will equal:
R, = T pe-,dt (15)
tc
Under these assumptions, the rents available from copying are
strictly less than the rents available for innovation. An individual
will therefore rationally choose to engage in copying only if the costs
of copying are strictly less than the costs of innovating. Under the
zero profit condition, additional imitators will continue to enter the
market until R. = C.
Even in the absence of patent protection, the lead-time rents avail-
able will prove sufficient for those innovative products with an ex-
pected cost, C, less than or equal to Ri. We can define this threshold
cost as C. Because the number of independent innovators and the
number of copiers are endogenously determined as functions of
the price consumers are initially willing to pay for the innovation, the
costs of innovation, the costs of imitation, and the time required to
imitate, we can define C = f(p, Ce, tj.
Comparative Statics. Before comparing R1 to the ideal, taking the par-
tial of R1 with respect to Tp establishes that R i is a decreasing function
of Tp and also therefore a decreasing function of Ni and N.. From equa-
tion (15), it is readily apparent that, all else constant, Re and hence N.
decrease as the time required to imitate an innovation increases. Sim-
ilarly holding R, constant, N, will decrease as C, increases. Ri there-
fore increases as the time and cost of imitation increase.
Comparison to the Ideal. If we assume that all other markets are
complete and perfectly competitive, so that a partial equilibrium
analysis is appropriate, then the social value of the innovation in our
model is defined by:
Wi = tpdt (16)
ti
From a social perspective, investing in an innovation is desirable so
long as:
W > Ci (17)
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However, the lead-time rents available in the absence of patent
protection will generally fall short of W. The only instance where R
will equal W will be where the innovator is a monopolist so that Ni =
N = 0 and therefore pD(N, No) = 0. In the usual case, where competi-
tive entry can occur, the lead-time rents available will leave a poten-
tial gap between profitability and desirability when:
W _ C,>R (18)
B. Innovation Rents in the Absence of Patent Protection:
Reputation Rents
The second source of innovation rents available in the absence of pat-
ent protection arises when consumers desire an innovative product or
service, but lack perfect information regarding which products or ser-
vices incorporate the latest innovations. In the presence of imperfect
information, developing a reputation for innovation can provide a
source of rents (or quasi rents) to fund innovation. Consider a case
where companies engage in a continual process of product improve-
ment and where all consumers purchase the product either once (or
not at all) on a periodic basis. To simplify the calculations involved,
we will use the following three-period model, with each period hav-
ing a uniform duration of t:
In period 0, a company chooses whether or not to invest in research
and development to ensure that its product or service remains at the
cutting edge of innovation. If the company chooses to invest, then it
will have an innovative product to offer at the start of period 1. Alter-
natively, the company may opt to copy the innovation of others. If a
company chooses to copy, the company makes no R&D investment
in period 0. Instead, so long as at least one of its competitors engages
in R&D and introduces an innovative product at the start of period 1,168
the company copies that innovation during period 1. Copying the
product requires some time, however. As a result, a copier will not in-
troduce its version of the innovative product at the start of period 1,
but after some fraction, q9 E (0, 1), of period 1 has elapsed.
A given number of homogenous consumers, represented by the
range [0,1], are each willing to pay a premium, p, over the price for the
non-innovative version of the product in order to receive the innova-
tive version of the product. For the sake of convenience and to focus
on the incentive for innovation, we will assume that the price for the
non-innovative version of a product is zero. Each consumer purchases
the product once during time periods 1 and 2, with consumer pur-
168 If no competitor innovates, then copying is not an option. In such a case, the only
choice is between innovating or not innovating.
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chases distributed uniformly over each time period. In order to en-
sure equilibrium, we will assume that consumers can determine the
total market share of the companies that will innovate in period 1,
but they cannot determine before their purchase whether a particu-
lar company's product is the innovative or non-innovative version.
After they have purchased, they will learn whether the product they
purchased was innovative. If they receive a non-innovative product in
period 1, then they will assume that that company's products will re-
main non-innovative in period 2. Consumers who are disappointed
with a company's products in period 1 will not only refuse to pay p for
that company's products in period 2, but will switch and purchase the
product from an innovative company in period 2.169
Let p.i be the company's market share at the start of period 1, g. be
the total market share of innovative companies, and the remainder,
1 - pg be held by competitors who imitate. In period 1, the company will
be able to charge gip to all its customers, whether the company inno-
vates or not. In period 2, however, if the company was innovative (i.e.
invested in R&D in period 0), then the company will be able to charge
p to its existing market share. The company will also capture a pro-
portionate share of the consumers who purchased a non-innovative
product from a copying competitor. With a discount rate per period of
6, the company's discounted revenue from being innovative is:
Ri= 8g{+ +68[l + (p")D (19)
If the company chooses to imitate, rather than innovate, then it will
charge gp to all of its customers in period 1. However, because of the
time required for imitation, a fraction, yp, of its consumers will actu-
ally receive a non-innovative version of the product. As a result, in pe-
riod 2, a copying competitor will lose a corresponding fraction of its
market share and be able to charge p only to its remaining customers.
A copying competitor will therefore earn discounted revenue of:
Re = 8g.p[g + 8(1 - (p)] (20)
A reputation for innovation therefore generates an incentive to in-
novative precisely equal to the difference between the discounted in-
novation revenue and the discounted imitation revenue:
IR = Ri - R = 82gip( (21)
169 The working assumption behind this formulation of the model is that con-
sumers, if they purchased a non-innovative version of the product in period 1, will poll
a sufficiently large sample of their peers and purchase from one of the companies unan-
imously reported to be innovative.
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. 61
If innovating entails a fixed cost Ci in period 0, and imitating entails
a fixed cost Cc in period 1, then a company will invest in the R&D
necessary to keep its product at the innovative forefront so long as:
IR +8C 0 C' (22)
Comparative Statics Analysis. Before comparing I, to the ideal, tak-
ing partial derivatives of IR with respect to a company's market share,
the time required for imitation, and the proportion of the company's
competitors engaged in copying rather than innovation establishes
the following:
1) The innovation rents available from reputation are a nonde-
creasing function of a firm's market share.
Specifically, if we assume that gt, remains constant as gi varies, then
the partial of I, with respect to g is:
--p~I >0=g 82PT)g
On the other hand, if the company at issue is the only innovative
firm in the market, so that ji = gi, then (21) becomes:
In this case, the partial of IR with respect to g exactly equals zero.
2) The innovation rents available from reputation increase with
the time required for others to copy an innovation.
If we assume that gi and g remain constant as (p varies, then the par-
tial of IR with respect to q is:
= 2 -ip I 
> 0
3) The innovation rents available from reputation increase
with the proportion of competing firms that imitate, rather
than innovate.
To see this, we will define the proportion of the company's com-
petitors engaged in copying, rather than innovation as k E [0,1]. For-
mally let k = 1 - g/1 - gi or g = 1 - X(1 - l'). Substituting for g, we can
rewrite (21) as:
IR = 82gp 1 (1 -gd) (21")
Given (21"), the partial of IR with respect to ?, becomes:
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ax [1 - ( i]2
with equality when gt = 1.
Comparison to the Ideal. If we assume that all other markets are
complete and perfectly competitive, so that a partial equilibrium
analysis is appropriate, then the social value of the innovation in our
model is defined by:
Wi = 5(1 + 8)p (23)
In the absence of patent protection, the reputation rents otherwise
available will generally fall short of the ideal unless the company is a
monopolist. 17 0 If the company is a monopolist, such that gi = 1, then
the discounted revenue from innovation in (19) will exactly equal the
optimal level of incentive, Wi, as set forth in (23). Moreover, if the
company is a monopolist, there is no other from whom the company
can copy, and if no one innovates, then consumers will not (by as-
sumption) pay p for any product. As a result, the discounted revenue
170 A second exception may arise if an innovator can license her innovation to her
competitors. See, e.g., Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention at 619-22 (cited in note 138). If the innovator agrees to license her innova-
tion to all of her competitors, enabling the competitors to introduce the innovative
product either at the start of period 1 or in any event before they could introduce the
innovative product through copying, then competitors would be willing to pay a li-
cense fee for such earlier access to the innovation. The maximum license fee that a
competitor would be willing to pay would depend upon the fixed cost of imitating and
the additional revenue earned as a result of the time saved by licensing. If there are a
sufficient number of competitors willing to license, and the cost and time required to
imitate are sufficiently large, the license fees available could equal (or by eliminating
the deadweight loss of competitors' reinventing the wheel) exceed the optimal inno-
vation incentive. While a full consideration of this possibility is beyond the scope of
this article, such a licensing arrangement would present severe coordination problems.
For a firm to invest in period 0 relying on potential licensing revenue at the start of pe-
riod 1, the firm would have to know which competitors would be willing to license in
period 1, rather than innovate themselves. Moreover, firms intending to license at the
start of period 1 would have to know that some other firm would innovate and hence
have the innovative version of the product available for licensing at the start of period
1. In addition, if such innovation and subsequent licensing appears an attractive option
for one firm and the firms face similar innovation and copying costs, the other firms
would also presumably prefer to innovate and collect licensing fees, leaving no firms
interested in licensing. Patents might prove useful as a means of facilitating (or forc-
ing) such licensing agreements, but because of the two- to three-year delay typically
involved in obtaining a patent, it is not clear that patents are well-tailored to facilitate
licensing in the model's context of continual, ongoing product improvement over rel-
atively short time periods. For an approach to the issue of patent scope that focuses on
the role of licensing for second generation products in the absence of uncertainty, see
Scotchmer, 27 RAND J Econ (cited in note 155).
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from copying in (20) will exactly equal zero. Under these assump-
tions, the reputation rents available to a monopolist will exactly
equal the optimal level of incentive. 171
In the more general case, where ti < 1, IR will usually fall short of
W,, creating the potential for a gap between profitability and desir-
ability. From a social perspective, investing in the innovation is de-
sirable so long as:
W > C i  (24)
However, a reputation for innovation will ensure innovation only
to the point where IR + 5C > C i. A reputation for innovation therefore
leaves a potential gap between profitability and desirability when:
wi >_ c, > I, + 8(25)
As was the case for lead-time rents, the availability of reputation
rents will tend therefore to ensure some level of innovation. Precisely
how much will depend on the time and expense required to imitate,
rather than innovate, and upon the market share of the innovator. If
we take the practical difficulty of imitating, the proportion of com-
petitors who will innovate, and the innovator's market share as given,
and assume that a reputation for innovation will develop, then there
will be some threshold innovation cost at which the costs of innova-
tion will precisely equal the reputation rents, such that Ci = I, + C c .
If we define that threshold cost as C = f(gt, X, p, C), then patent pro-
tection is necessary to close the gap between profitability and desir-
ability left by reputation rents only for those innovations whose cost
exceeds C.
C. The Relevant Gap: Unusually Creative Innovations
This analysis suggests that in the absence of patent protection the
rents available from the lead-time advantage or the reputation ob-
tained through innovation leave a gap between profitability and de-
171 Please note that if consumer demand for the innovative product is not a step
function, then in the absence of perfect price discrimination, the reputation rents
available even to a monopolist will fall short of the optimal level of incentive. Because
a step function demand is unlikely to represent actual market conditions, reputation
rents will almost invariably fall below the optimal level of incentive. However, for pur-
poses of identifying where the relevant profitability-desirability gap arises, this fact is
not relevant for two reasons. First, it does not change the qualitative conclusion that
there is some incentive available for routine innovation even in the absence of patent
protection. Second, we must be careful not to justify providing patent protection using
the desirability-profitability gap that arises from an inability to price discriminate per-
fectly if the innovator will remain equally unable to price discriminate perfectly with
a patent.
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sirability for innovations whose cost exceeds some threshold level, C.
Even in the absence of patent protection, the availability of lead-time
rents or reputation rents will ensure an adequate incentive for the
creation of less costly (or "routine") innovations. Particularly given
the availability of copyright protection to guard against simple me-
chanical duplication, the relevant profitability-desirability gap that
patent law should address appears to be the gap that arises for those
more costly innovations that otherwise lack sufficient incentive
from the marketplace.
Having identified the underlying economic considerations and
the relevant profitability-desirability gap, we now move to an evalua-
tion of the normative desirability of the quiet revolution that the Fed-
eral Circuit has brought to patents measured against the costs of
uniformity and the information costs of individually tailored (or vari-
able) protection.
VI. UNIFORMITY, VARIABILITY, AND
INFORMATION COSTS
Although the switch to narrower, but routinely valid patents appears
to miss the relevant desirability-profitability gap, the switch may
nonetheless enhance social welfare if the information and other
transaction costs entailed in tailoring patent protection more closely
to the relevant gap are sufficiently high. As discussed, uniformity in
patent protection is a potentially rational response to high infor-
mation and other transaction costs. With perfect information and
costlessly enforceable legal rules, a government regulator should in-
dividually tailor protection to each innovation, ensuring that each in-
novation receives precisely that protection, but no more, necessary to
ensure its development and disclosure. Gathering the information
and then enforcing the legal rules necessary to achieve such individ-
ually tailoring is costly, however. To explore this trade-off, and its im-
plications for the normative desirability of the switch from rarely
valid, but broadly enforced, to routinely valid, but narrowly enforced
patents, we begin with a numerical example.
A. An Illustration of the Uniformity-Variability Trade-Offs
Assume that there are four innovations potentially eligible for patent
protection. Each innovation has an unrestricted social value of 35,
but the innovations require varying levels of patent protection to en-
sure their expected profitability, ranging from no protection for inno-
vation A to level 3 protection for innovation D. As the degree of pat-
ent protection increases, the associated restrictions on the use of the
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Table 1. Distribution of Potentially Patentable Innovations





information aspect of the protected innovation steadily increase, and
the associated social value of the protected innovation steadily de-
creases. For purposes of this example, we will assume that the social
value of an innovation falls by 10 for each level of patent protection
provided. Table 1 summarizes these assumptions:
Case #1: No Specific Information. In the first case, the government
regulator is aware of the distribution of the innovations, their unre-
stricted social values, and the reduction of social value associated
with increasing levels of patent protection. While the regulator can
also distinguish innovations from prior art, the government regulator
has no information regarding the level of patent protection required
to ensure the expected profitability (and hence, the existence) of any
given innovation. Because the regulator cannot distinguish those in-
novations that would not have been devised or disclosed but for the
inducement of a patent, the regulator cannot enforce a rule that
would exclude innovation A from patentability. Similarly, lacking the
necessary information to differentiate the various innovations, the
regulator cannot tie the protection provided any given innovation to
the level required to ensure its expected profitability. As a result, the
regulator has no choice but to provide a uniform level of protection
for all innovations. Given the information available, and the result-
ing choice the regulator faces, the optimal decision is to provide level
1 to all innovations.
Uniformly providing level 1 protection increases social welfare
compared to providing no protection. By uniformly providing level 1
protection, the regulator ensures the expected profitability of innova-
tion B, generating an increase in social welfare of 25-the level 1 re-
stricted social value of innovation B. On the other hand, providing
uniform level 1 protection also reduces the social value of preexisting
innovation A by 10. Moving from level 0 to level 1 uniform protection
thus generates a net social gain of 15 and is therefore desirable.
In contrast, moving from level 1 to level 2 is undesirable, if the in-
creased protection is made uniformly available to all innovations.
Moving to a uniform level 2 ensures the expected profitability of in-
novation C and thereby generates social value of 15-the social value
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of innovation C when use of innovation C is restricted by level 2 pro-
tection. However, if the protection is uniformly provided, moving to
level 2 protection reduces the social value associated with preexist-
ing innovations A and B by 10 a piece. Moving to level 2 therefore gen-
erates a net social loss of -5.
Case #2: Regulator Can Identify Those Innovations That Will Be
Devised and Disclosed Without a Patent, But Cannot Distinguish
Between Innovations B, C, and D. Again, given the limited informa-
tion available, the regulator will choose uniform protection for those
innovations that receive a patent. However, because the regulator can
distinguish those innovations that would be devised and disclosed
without a patent, i.e. innovation A, the regulator will adopt and en-
force a rule excluding innovation A from patent protection. Facing a
choice of providing some level of uniform protection to the remain-
ing innovations, the regulator will then choose to offer level 2 pro-
tection uniformly to innovations B, C, and D.
By moving from level 1 protection to level 2, the regulator ensures
the existence of innovation C and thereby generates social value of
15. Because the regulator has excluded innovation A from patent pro-
tection, moving to level 2 protection reduces the social value of only
one preexisting innovation, innovation B. Although moving from
level 1 to level 2 protection reduces the social value of innovation B
by 10, in this case, the switch to level 2 generates a net social gain of
5 and is therefore desirable. By excluding innovation A from patent-
ability, the regulator reduces the social cost of expanding uniform
patent protection and can therefore offer a more expansive level of
uniform protection to the remaining innovations. The regulator can
therefore offer broader protection than was optimal in Case #1 and
can thereby ensure the existence of the more expensive innovation C.
However, even after excluding innovation A from protection,
switching to level 3 protection remains undesirable. Providing level
3 protection would ensure the expected profitability of innovation D
and thereby generate a social gain of 5-the level 3 restricted social
value of innovation D. Yet, if the same level 3 protection were uni-
formly provided to innovations B and C as well, providing uniform
level 3 protection would reduce the social value of these preexisting
innovations by 10 a piece. With uniform protection for innovations B,
C, and D, moving from level 2 to level 3 protection would therefore
generate a net social loss of -15, even if innovation A were excluded
from protection. As a result, even though there would likely be a pos-
itive social rate of return associated with innovation D, the costs of
uniformity dictate that we should not extend patent protection to en-
sure innovation D's expected profitability.
Case #3: Regulator Has Perfect Information. If the regulator has
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perfect information and can costlessly enforce an individually-tailored
(or variable) system of patent protection, then the regulator would ex-
clude innovation A from patent protection, would provide level 1 pro-
tection to innovation B, level 2 protection to innovation C, and level
3 protection to innovation D.
Choosing the Optimal Case: While these cases are laid out as if the
information constraints were externally imposed on the regulator,
we can also use this example to illustrate the process by which a reg-
ulator would endogenously choose whether to expend the resources
necessary: (1) to distinguish (factually and legally) innovation A from
innovations B, C, and D; and (2) to distinguish between innovations
B, C, and D. As established in Part IV above, the relevant rule is
straightforward: If the information and other transaction costs en-
tailed in moving the legal system from Case #1 to Case #2, or from
Case #2 to Case #3, are less than the marginal increase in the social
value of the innovations under the respective optimal schemes, then
the regulator should choose to spend the resources necessary to move
from one case to the next. For example, given the assumed distribu-
tion of innovations and social values, moving from Case #1 to Case
#2 generates a net social gain of 15.172 If gathering the necessary in-
formation to distinguish innovation A from the others and then
legally enforcing the exclusion of innovation A from patent protec-
tion costs less than 15, then the regulator should choose to expend
the necessary resources to move the legal regime from Case #1 to
Case #2. Similarly, moving from Case #2 to Case #3 also generates a
net social gain of 15.173 Again, if gathering the necessary information
and enforcing the necessary legal rules to move from Case #2 to Case
#3 costs less than 15, then the regulator should choose to expend the
information necessary to move the legal regime to Case #3.
B. Evaluating the Normative Desirability of Narrower, but
Routinely Valid Patents
In this light, the normative desirability of the switch to narrower, but
routinely valid patents depends entirely on the relative magnitudes of
the marginal gains from more closely tailoring patent protection to
the relevant desirability-profitability gap we have identified in Part V
172 Comparing the respective optimal schemes, such a move increases the social
value associated with innovation A by 10 by excluding it from patent protection, re-
duces the social value associated with innovation B by 10 by increasing its patent pro-
tection from level 1 to level 2, and adds the social value of innovation C, restricted by
level 2 protection, which is 15.
'73 This gain comes from reducing the level of patent protection provided to inno-
vation B from level 2 to level 1 and from ensuring the creation of innovation D.
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against the marginal information and other transaction costs such
tailoring would entail. Although the precise magnitude of these re-
spective gains and losses is an empirical matter, this analysis gives us
a clearer picture of the costs the switch implicates and the circum-
stances under which the switch might prove desirable.
First, to the extent that the Federal Circuit's evisceration of the
nonobviousness requirement effectively extends patent protection
to those technical advances that would have occurred in any event,
the Federal Circuit's doctrinal changes to the nonobviousness re-
quirement limit the patent system's ability to encourage more costly
innovation. In our example, the switch to narrower but routinely
valid patents would essentially move us from Case #2 to Case #1.
Under the traditional economic analysis, this is undesirable because
it extends protection to innovation A, even though such protection
is unnecessary to ensure innovation A's development and disclo-
sure. 1 74 Yet, this is not the only cost of the switch. After recognizing
the costs of uniformity, we can see that granting patents to routine
technical advances also limits our ability to use patent protection
to ensure the expected profitability of high cost innovations. As we
extend patent protection over a wider range of preexisting innova-
tions, the costs of any given expansion in uniform protection in-
crease. Granting patents to innovations, such as innovation A, that
would have occurred even without a patent drags down the optimal
level of uniform protection. Granting patents to routine technical ad-
vances will therefore limit our ability to provide patent protection
sufficient to ensure the expected profitability of desirable, but higher
cost innovations.
Second, in addition to limiting the range of innovation we can en-
courage through a uniform patent system, the switch towards nar-
rower, but routinely valid patents also removes two of the three key
doctrines through which courts could introduce desirable variability
into the level of patent protection provided individual innovations. 7 s
174 In addition, under the traditional analysis, if we focus solely on those innova-
tions that would still exist, the social loss from providing patent protection to innova-
tion A would be offset by the social gain from providing only level 1 protection to in-
novation B.
175 Professors Burk and Lemley have suggested that the use of the "person having
ordinary skill in the art" or "PHOSITA" in the nonobviousness requirement implic-
itly incorporates such variability across arts. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Pat-
ent Law Technology Specific?, 17 Berkeley Tech L J 1155 (2002). As they explain, for
those arts where the PHOSITA has more skill, that will make the nonobviousness re-
quirement tougher to satisfy because the more highly skilled PHOSITA will more
readily see any given difference between a claimed invention and the prior art as obvi-
ous. Although they did not extend their argument to the infringement inquiry
PHOSITA also plays a similar role in the doctrine of equivalents. One of the factors
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Even after we interpret the nonobviousness requirement to exclude
from patentability those technical advances that would be disclosed
or devised without a patent, there will remain a wide range of innova-
tive products that patent protection could potentially ensure. There
will be some innovative products whose expected cost only slightly
exceeds C. For these innovative products, some minimal level of pat-
ent protection will suffice to ensure expected profitability. There will
also be some innovative products whose expected costs far exceed C.
For these innovative products, we will need to promise far more sub-
stantial patent protection to ensure their expected profitability
Traditionally, courts used the nonobviousness doctrine,1 76 the lit-
eral language of the patent claims, and the doctrine of equivalents to
introduce the desired variation into patent law's otherwise uniform
protection. For example, courts have traditionally granted "pioneer-
ing inventions"1 7 7 a broader range of equivalents and a correspond-
courts have identified as relevant to determining whether a given element is an equiv-
alent to a claimed element is whether a PHOSITA would recognize the given element
as a substitute for the claimed element. Again, in those arts where the PHOSITA has a
higher skill level, presumably the PHOSITA will more readily recognize such substi-
tutability and hence a broader range of equivalents will apply. While varying the skill
level of the PHOSITA associated with different arts can therefore vary the require-
ments for and scope of patent protection for different arts, such an approach does not
vary the requirements for or scope of protection within an art. Once the skill level of
the PHOSITA for a given art has been set, presumably that same skill level will apply
to all patents in the relevant art and hence reinforce uniformity of patent protection
for each given art. My working assumption is that, within each art, there is a range of
innovations that patent protection could potentially ensure. As a result, manipulation
of the PHOSITA standards across different arts cannot introduce the requisite variation
within an art.
176 Although the nonobviousness requirement is a bright line in a legal sense-ob-
vious technical advances are not patentable; nonobvious technical advances are-ap-
plication of the nonobviousness requirement to particular cases is a necessarily hu-
man and therefore imprecise exercise. If we place technical advances on a spectrum
from the least significant advances to the most significant, at one end will be those
technical advances that virtually all judges in all cases will find obvious; at the other
end will be those technical advances that virtually all judges will find nonobvious. As
we move from one end of the spectrum to the other, the chance that a technical ad-
vance, given the judge drawn and the attorneys and parties involved, will survive an ob-
viousness challenge steadily increases. If patented inventions otherwise receive iden-
tical protection, increasing or decreasing the chance that the invention will be found
obvious can introduce variation into the effective protection provided any given
patented invention.
117 The Court has defined a pioneering invention as one that is "a distinct step
in the progress of the art, distinguished from a mere improvement or perfection of
what had gone before." Westinghouse v Boyden Power Brake Co, 170 US 537, 562
(1898); see also Texas Instr, Inc v US Intl Trade Comm'n, 846 F2d 1369, 1370 (Fed
Cir 1988) (adopting the definition of pioneering invention from Westinghouse, 170 US
at 562).
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ingly broader scope under the doctrine of equivalents.178 By narrowly
interpreting both the nonobviousness requirement and the doctrine of
equivalents, the switch to routinely valid, but narrowly enforced pat-
ents sharply reduces the room for judicially tailoring patent protec-
tion to the individually optimal level. After the switch, courts can rely
only on the more limited discretion left in interpreting the words of
the patent claim to introduce the desired variation in a patent's scope.
While interpreting patent claims offers some room for individually
tailoring protection, 7 9 the discretion available through claim inter-
pretation is not as well suited as the nonobviousness requirement
and the doctrine of equivalents to matching the economic rents gen-
erated to the reservation cost for a particular innovation.
The key issue in determining a patent's effective scope is its effec-
tiveness at excluding competitors from a distinct product market, ei-
ther by increasing the cost of introducing, or delaying the introduc-
tion of, would-be competitors' products. For a number of reasons, the
doctrine of equivalents addresses this issue far more directly than the
process of claims interpretation. A claim is written before the market
has developed, when the precise nature of consumer preferences and
the various forms that competitors' products can take is as yet un-
certain. The general rule of claim construction-that "the con-
struing court interprets words in a claim as one of skill in the art at
178 The Federal Circuit initially embraced this aspect of the doctrine of equivalents,
see Perkin-Elmer Corp v Westinghouse Elec Corp, 822 F2d 1528, 1532 (Fed Cir 1987);
Thomas & Betts Corp v Litton Sys, Inc, 720 F2d 1572,1579 (Fed Cir 1983), but has sub-
sequently questioned it. See Augustine Medical, Inc v Gaymar Indus., Inc, 181 F3d
1291, 1301 (Fed Cir 1999). Despite this questioning, this application of the doctrine of
equivalents, along with the doctrine more generally, survives, at least for now. See, e.g.,
Molten Metal Equipment Innovations, Inc v Metaullics Systems Co, 2003 US App.
LEXIS 1821, at *11, 14 (Fed Cir 2003) (reinstating jury verdict finding infringement
based upon the following instructions: "In the event an invention achieves a major or
extraordinary advance over the prior art, and as such may properly be characterized as
a pioneering invention, the claims are entitled to a broad or liberal range of equivalents.
On the other hand, if the advances over the prior art are narrow or minor, the range of
equivalents is correspondingly more restricted and the claims are entitled to only a
narrow range of equivalents.").
179 For example, in the case of pioneering inventions, a panel of the Federal Circuit
has stated:
Without extensive prior art to confine and cabin their claims, pioneers acquire
broader claims than non-pioneers who must craft narrow claims to evade the
strictures of a crowded art field. Thus, claim scope itself generally supplies
broader exclusive entitlements to the pioneer.
Augustine Medical, Inc, 181 F3d at 1301. The absence of a well-established record
of prior arts for new patentable subject matters, such as computer programs and busi-
ness methods, has also left room for often overly broad claims in these newly patent-
able fields.
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the time of invention would understand them" 80-reinforces the ex
ante nature of the discretion inherent in claim interpretation. In ad-
dition, while patent attorneys always attempt to balance obtaining
broader claim language against the legal prerequisites of patentabil-
ity, at the drafting stage, uncertainty over the form competition may
eventually take,' 81 as well as the certainty that only a fraction of is-
sued patents will ever result in litigation, tend to tilt that balance to-
wards satisfying the legal prerequisites for patentability.
In contrast, under the doctrine of equivalents, we resolve the ques-
tion whether a substituted element is the equivalent of a claimed el-
ement as of the time the infringement occurs. 8 2 We resolve the doc-
trine of equivalents issue only for those patents the value of which
the fact of litigation has proven. And traditionally, the doctrine of
equivalents, rather than focus on the necessarily imprecise words
used to claim the invention, focused more directly on the extent to
which the allegedly infringing product or process is likely to serve as
a competitive substitute for the patented invention. However artful a
patent attorney may be, focusing on whether the allegedly infringing
device or process "performs substantially the same function in sub-
stantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result" is
likely to address far more directly the competitive substitutability of
defendant's device or process than attempting to match the defen-
dant's device or process to the precise words of a patent claim. The
discretion available under the doctrine of equivalents is therefore
likely to prove far more effective at identifying competitive substi-
tutes and, for that reason, far more useful in tailoring individually op-
timal patent protection.1
8 3
180 Eastman Kodak Co v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 114 F3d 1547, 1555 (Fed
Cir) (emphasis added), modified on other grounds on rehearing, 114 F3d 1564 (Fed
Cir 1997).
" Professor Mark Lemley has made a similar argument with respect to the Patent
and Trademark Office's often cursory examination of patent applications. See Mark A.
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw U L Rev 1495 (2001).
12 See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co v Hilton Davis Chem Co, 520 US 17, 37 (1995)
("Insofar as the question under the doctrine of equivalents is whether an accused ele-
ment is equivalent to a claimed element, the proper time for evaluating equivalency-
and thus knowledge of interchangeability between elements-is at the time of in-
fringement, not at the time the patent was issued.").
183 In criticizing the traditional rule that pioneering innovations receive a broader
range of equivalents, the Augustine Medical panel offered the following argument:
At the outset, this court notes that no objective legal test separates pioneers
from non-pioneers. Furthermore, it is impossible for this court or the PTO to
predict the future of any given technology and thereby determine the likelihood
that an invention will open vast new vistas of innovation. The peripheral claim-
ing system itself, however, makes the best distinction between pioneers and
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A vibrant nonobviousness doctrine offers similar advantages. Re-
lying on claim language alone presupposes that there is some defin-
able relationship between the scope of a patent and the rents available
to the patent owner. Yet, one of the great mysteries in economics is
how prices will behave in cases other than perfect competition or
monopoly. If protection results in an effective monopoly over the in-
novative product's market, then economic theory provides a reason-
ably definitive guide to the likely rents available to the patent holder.
If the monopoly rents available happen to equal precisely the reser-
vation cost for the innovation, then matching patent scope to reser-
vation cost is relatively straightforward. If, however, the monopoly
rents available would exceed the innovations reservation cost, the
question becomes more difficult. One possibility would be to narrow
the scope of the patent, so that the patent holder no longer possesses
an effective monopoly. Others could then enter the market, and we
can hope that the resulting imperfect competition may generate rents
that approximate the innovations reservation costs.
The difficulty with such an approach is that once we allow others
to enter the market, economic theory no longer provides a single
answer to the rents the patent holder will likely collect. Even a
move from one firm in a market to two firms in a market renders
uncertain the rents a firm will collect. Under one economic model-
the Cournot model-prices in a market with two competitors of-
fering identical goods fall somewhat from monopolistic levels, but
remain well above competitive levels. In contrast, under another
model-the Bertrand model-prices in the same duopoly market fall
to marginal cost.
As a result of these uncertainties, if we know that the reservation
cost for a given innovation is exactly half the monopoly rents avail-
able, there is no clear answer as to how to achieve that return if we
rely solely on narrowing the patent's scope. In contrast, we could en-
sure the appropriate incentive by granting a patent that would pro-
vide an effective monopoly over the market, if valid, but impose a
non-pioneers. Pioneers enjoy the benefits of their contribution to the art in the
form of broader claims.
Augustine Medical, Inc v Gaymar Indus, Inc, 181 F3d 1291, 1301 (Fed Cir 1999). The
Augustine Medical panel's argument is curious. By the time a patent issues and comes
to litigation, there is often no need for the court or the PTO "to predict the future" to
determine whether a patented invention has proven pioneering. The "new vistas of in-
novation" will either have developed or not. If they have not, certainly the court will
be in a better position to evaluate the likelihood that they will develop at the time lit-
igation ensues that either the PTO, the patent applicant, or the patent attorneys were
at the time the application was filed and prosecuted.
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fifty percent chance that the patent will be held invalid as obvious. If
patent holders are risk neutral, as one would expect for corporations
with large patent portfolios, then the expected rent from a fifty per-
cent chance of having an effective monopoly would approximate the
appropriate incentive.
By strictly limiting the discretion available under the nonobvious-
ness doctrine and the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit's
switch to routinely valid, but narrowly enforced patents limits our
ability to introduce desirable variation into the otherwise uniform
protection patents provide. Limiting the patent system's ability to
tailor protection to a particular innovations individually optimal
level limits in turn the patent system's ability to provide protection
sufficient to ensure the expected profitability for the full range of de-
sirable innovations eligible for patent protection.
While a conclusive empirical resolution of the optimal level of
variability in patent protection is beyond the scope of this paper, our
analysis establishes that the ultimate question is whether the infor-
mation and other costs entailed in crafting and enforcing a somewhat
more discerning system are justified by the benefits from: (1) reduc-
ing the extent to which some innovations are overprotected in a more
uniform system; and (2) increasing our ability to provide protection
sufficient to ensure the expected profitability of more costly innova-
tions. The switch to routinely valid patents is normatively desirable
under our analysis if and only if we cannot reliably (or at a reasonable
cost) separate those innovations that would have been devised and
disclosed without a patent from those innovations that would not be
devised and disclosed but for a patent. Similarly, the switch to nar-
rower patents is normatively desirable if and only if we cannot reli-
ably (or at a reasonable cost) differentiate those innovations that re-
quire somewhat more extensive patent protection to ensure their
expected profitability from those innovations that require some-
what less. Only if these information costs are prohibitive should we
close our eyes and embrace the Federal Circuit's "one size fits all" pat-
ent protection.
C. Brief Discussion of the Supposed Advantages of the Switch
Although the Federal Circuit has not offered a policy justification for
its rewriting of the nonobviousness requirement, the Federal Circuit
and the Court have offered two arguments to justify their decisions
to narrow the doctrine of equivalents. First, the Federal Circuit has
argued that a narrower doctrine of equivalents forces the patent
holder to internalize the cost of defining a patent's scope. In Sage
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Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc., 184 the Federal Circuit held
that the doctrine of equivalents could not be used to encompass a
foreseeable variation of the patented invention. 185 In justifying that
rule, the panel explained:
[A]s between the patent holder who had a clear opportunity to
negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and the public at
large, it is the patent holder who must bear the cost of its failure
to seek protection for this foreseeable alteration of its claimed
structure.... Because the doctrine of equivalents blurs the line
of demarcation between infringing and non-infringing activity,
it creates a zone of uncertainty, into which competitors tread
only at their peril. Given a choice of imposing the higher costs
of careful prosecution on patent holders, or imposing the costs
of foreclosed business activity on the public at large, this court
believes the costs are properly imposed on the group best posi-
tioned to determine whether or not a particular invention war-
rants investment at a higher level, that is, the patent holders.
186
Although the panel's decision to portray the doctrine of equivalents
as creating undesirable externalities renders the panel's reasoning su-
perficially attractive, an arbitrary choice of phrasing does not repre-
sent a reasoned analysis. While the public at large benefits from
competition, it also benefits from innovation. While the patent holder
could have chosen to spend more on patent prosecution, would-be
competitors can similarly choose to spend more to ensure that they
avoid a patent's reach. 87 A vibrant doctrine of equivalents may limit
184 126 F3d 1420 (Fed Cir 1997).
'I- Sage Prods, Inc, 126 F3d at 1425.
186 Id (citations omitted).
187 Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer have pointed out, as prices move from a competi-
tive level to a full monopoly level, social costs are highest, relative to the additional
profit accruing to the patent holder, for the last increment, as the patent holder's price
moves from just below the full monopoly price to the full monopoly price. See Ayres
& Klemperer, 97 Mich L Rev 985 at 989-93 (cited in note 12). Although I am not cer-
tain of the practical significance of this point for optimal design of a patent system, its
corollary is that the social costs of supracompetitive pricing are lowest, relative to the
patent holder's additional profit, for the first increment, as the patent holder's price
moves incrementally from a competitive level to just above a competitive level. If, as
Ayres and Klemperer argue, this relationship between social cost and rents suggests
that we should leave a patent holder somewhat uncertain of the precise scope of her
patent in order to discourage her from charging the full monopoly price, see id at 993-
1007, we may also want to leave would-be competitors uncertain as to the patent's pre-
cise scope. Uncertainty for would-be competitors would tend to ensure that the patent
holder could charge a price, at least, slightly above a competitive level and could
thereby capture the rents available from such pricing. Such an approach would tend to
provide patent holders with rents at the lowest social cost.
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competitors' ability to enter a market, but narrowing the doctrine of
equivalents is likely to increase the costs of patenting8 s and to reduce
the effective scope of patents. 89 To the extent that patents play an im-
portant role in innovation, narrowing the doctrine of equivalents is
likely to reduce the incentives for, and hence the resources invested
in, innovation. Whether society is better off with somewhat more in-
novation or somewhat less is a difficult question, but it is not one that
we can answer by pretending that society's interests lie solely in leav-
ing room for competition.
Second, both the Federal Circuit and the Court have reiterated Jus-
tice Campbell's concern that a vibrant doctrine of equivalents injects
undue uncertainty into a patent's scope. 90 But it is a mistake to as-
sume that claim language, simply because it is written down, is nec-
essarily clear. The language of a claim is not like the language of a
deed. With a deed, the language describes physical dimensions and
boundaries of a parcel of land and can do so quite literally. A patent
claim, on the other hand, is meant to describe an intangible bound-
ary-the scope and limits of an invention-and can necessarily do so
only approximately. There is no reason to believe, simply as a matter
of logic, that would-be competitors can better predict how their de-
vice or process will fare against a formal and legalistic interpretation
of the language of a patent claim, than they can predict how it will
fare against a more pragmatic test focusing on the essence of the
patented invention.
Empirically, if the shift towards a narrower doctrine of equivalents
increased certainty and predictability, then we should find a signifi-
cant decrease in success rate variability under the Federal Circuit. 191
1s8 Even the Federal Circuit has acknowledged this point. See Sage Prods, Inc, 126
F3d at 1425 ("This court recognizes that such reasoning places a premium on fore-
thought in patent drafting. Indeed this premium may lead to higher costs of patent
prosecution.").
1s9 Perhaps the Federal Circuit hopes that patent holders will draft and pursue vig-
orously broader claims so that the effective scope of protection remains effectively the
same, but with less uncertainty. Yet, the striking increase in the percentage of no in-
fringement results reflected in Figure 3 suggest that so far the effect of the Federal Cir-
cuit's doctrinal changes has been to narrow the effective scope of patents. See text ac-
companying notes 29-31.
190 Compare Warner-Jenkinson Co v Hilton Davis Chem Co, 520 US 17, 29 (1997)
("There can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when broadly applied, con-
flicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming re-
quirement."), with Festo Corp v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co, 535 US 722,
732-33 (2002) (recognizing the uncertainty the doctrine of equivalents may create, but
noting that "[t]hese concerns ... are not new").
191 This is particularly true given that the Federal Circuit's evisceration of the
nonobviousness requirement has eliminated one of the significant sources of such
variability.
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Yet, the data reveals exactly the opposite-variability in the success
rate has increased under the Federal Circuit. If we take the success
rate for each of the six pre-Federal Circuit time periods as discrete
data points, then the success rate over those six periods had a stan-
dard deviation of only 3.25 percent. In contrast, if we take each of the
nine post-Federal Circuit time periods as discrete data points, then
the post-Federal Circuit success rate had a standard deviation of 9.54
percent. Even if we limit our sample to the six post-Federal Circuit
time periods since the Federal Circuit began to move towards a nar-
rower doctrine of equivalents in Pennwalt Corp., the standard devia-
tion of the success rate remains a strikingly high 10.2 percent. If we
assume that the considerations that drive the process by which par-
ties select cases for appellate resolution have remained roughly con-
stant, the increased variability in success rates suggests that parties
are less able to predict appellate litigation outcomes under the Fed-
eral Circuit.192 This in turn suggests that the Federal Circuit and its
doctrinal changes have brought less certainty and predictability to
patent enforcement. 1
93
Reversal rates on the infringement issue provide further support
for the proposition that narrowing the doctrine of equivalents does
192 To explain this increased variability, it is not enough to suggest that district
courts are unprepared to apply correctly the legal rules of claim interpretation. Kim-
berly A. Moore, Are District Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 Harv J L &
Tech 1 (2001) (arguing that reversal rates are high because district judges are not well-
equipped to interpret patent claims). Even if district judges routinely make mistakes
that are unlikely to survive the de novo standard of review for claim construction that
the Federal Circuit has imposed, see Cybor Corp v FAS Techs, 138 F3d 1448, 1454-56
(Fed Cir 1998) (en banc), increased variance in success rates should arise only if the par-
ties are unable to predict how the Federal Circuit will resolve the claim construction
issue. De novo review should make that prediction easier, because it is no longer
clouded by the possibility that the level of deference given to a district court's claim
construction under a clearly erroneous standard might vary among Federal Circuit
judges. My own sense, agreeing with a view recently expressed by Polk Wagner and Lee
Petherbridge, is that there remains a contingent of Federal Circuit judges that continue
to follow the traditional approach to patents on both validity and infringement issues.
Lunney, 7 Mich Telecommun & Tech L Rev 363 at 393 (cited in note 16) ("Years of ju-
risprudence based upon the traditional perspective are unlikely to disappear without a
trace, particularly where the Court has so far refused to repudiate its own longstand-
ing jurisprudence reflecting that perspective. Even some members of the Federal Cir-
cuit may retain some continuing commitment to the traditional perspective."); R. Polk
Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Look at
Claim Construction (available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/research.
html) (last visited April 29, 2003). The increased variance thus arises from: (i) differ-
ences among Federal Circuit judges in interpreting claims; (ii) the random selection of
judges for particular panels; and (iii) the Federal Circuit's refusal to identify the panel
of judges who will hear a case until the morning of the appellate argument.
193 Compare Dreyfuss, 64 NYU L Rev at 9-10 (cited in note 12) (arguing that Federal
Circuit had brought greater certainty and predictability to patent enforcement).
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not ensure certainty. 94 In the last year of our sample, for example, of
the ninety-eight cases in which the Federal Circuit addressed the is-
sue of infringement, the Federal Circuit reversed or vacated the dis-
trict court's judgment on the issue of infringement in thirty-eight of
them.195 If a district judge with no particular stake in the issue has
such trouble resolving the issue correctly, even after hearing argu-
ment from presumably competent counsel on both sides, there is
little reason to believe that a would-be competitor, with advice only
from its own counsel and its own self-interest in entering the market
at stake, will prove better able to determine the precise boundaries of
a patent under the Federal Circuit's approach.
These data suggest that the supposed certainty and predictability
of claim language is simply a myth. In the end, because words will
necessarily prove imprecise in defining the boundary of an invention,
there is little reason to believe that emphasizing claim language will
establish the certainty and predictability in defining patent bound-
aries that the Federal Circuit and the Court hope for. To the contrary,
the available empirical evidence suggests that parties were better able
114 Both Christian Chu and Kimberly Moore have documented the high reversal rates
involving claim construction. See Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal
Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 Berkeley Tech LJ 1075, 1097-1100 (2001) (not-
ing that despite the changes to the infringement inquiry, "the promises of pre-trial pre-
dictability and expedient patent litigation seem to remain a tantalizing dream");
Moore, 15 Harv J L & Tech at 14 (cited in note 192) ("This means that more than one
in four appealed patent cases involving claim construction result in overturning the
judgment reached by the district court solely for claim construction reasons.").
195 These cases include: Intermatic Inc v Lamson & Sessions Co, 273 F2d 1355 (Fed
Cir 2001) (reversing judgment of infringement for improper claim construction and
holding that, properly construed, patent could not be infringed as a matter of law), va-
cated for further consideration in light of Festo Corp, 535 US 722 (2002); Xerox Corp
v 3Com Corp, 267 F3d 1361 (Fed Cir 2001) (reversing summary judgment of nonin-
fringement for improper claim construction); Tapco Intl Corp v Van Mark Prods Corp,
2001 US App LEXIS 18330 (Fed Cir 2001) (reversing summary judgment of infringe-
ment for improper claim construction); Durel Corp v Osram Sylvania, Inc, 256 F3d
1298 (Fed Cir 2001) (reversing judgment of infringement for improper claim construc-
tion of term "oxide coating"); Unique Coupons, Inc v Northfield Corp, 2001 US App
LEXIS 12839 (Fed Cir 2001) (reversing judgment of infringement for improper claim
construction); Somfy, SA v Springs Window Fashions Div, Inc, 2001 US App LEXIS
8482 (Fed Cir 2001) (reversing summary judgment of noninfringement and remanding
for trial on infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); Mentor HIS, Inc v Medical
Device Alliance, Inc, 244 F3d 1365 (Fed Cir 2001) (reversing judgment as matter of law
of noninfringement and reinstating jury verdict of contributory infringement); Opti-
mal Rec Solutions, LLP v Leading Edge Techs, 2001 US App LEXIS 5772 (Fed Cir 2001)
(vacating holding of noninfringement for improper claim construction); AFG Indus v
Cardinal IG Co, 239 F3d 1239 (Fed Cir 2001) (vacating summary judgment of nonin-
fringement for improper claim construction); Wenger Mfg, Inc v Coating Mach Sys,
Inc, 239 F3d 1225 (Fed Cir 2001) (reversing summary judgment of noninfringement for
improper claim construction).
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to predict infringement outcomes under the traditional doctrine of
equivalents' more pragmatic function-way-result test than they are
under the precise words of the patent claim, legally interpreted.
Moreover, even if we assumed-contrary to what the empirical ev-
idence suggests-that a narrower doctrine of equivalents slightly in-
creased certainty in identifying patent boundaries, that increased
certainty would come at a steep price. By reducing the doctrine of
equivalents' ability to serve as a source of desirable variability in pat-
ent protection, narrowing the doctrine of equivalents directly limits
our ability to tailor protection to ensure profitability for a wider range
of desirable innovations eligible for patents. The certainty that the
Federal Circuit seeks thus comes at the expense of ensuring the ex-
pected profitability (and hence, the likely existence) of more expen-
sive, but still socially desirable innovations.
VII. INNOVATION, INFORMATION, AND
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Under the traditional economic analysis of patents, the costs of pat-
ent protection arise directly from the tension between private rights
and public goods. However, if providing patent protection ensures the
creation of a desirable information product and does so more effi-
ciently than the plausible alternatives, such as direct government
subsidies, the fact that the information product could have been
more valuable still in the absence of the patent's protection has little
practical significance. Rather than follow the traditional analysis,
this article identifies the uniformity of patent protection as the prin-
cipal source of a patent's social cost. To the extent that we provide the
same protection to all information products that satisfy a uniform
set of prerequisites, broader patent protection entails a trade-off be-
tween: (i) the social value of the additional information products
broader protection ensures; and (ii) the reduced social value associ-
ated with the preexisting information products protected more
broadly than necessary to secure their discovery and disclosure.
Measured against the costs of uniformity, the switch to routinely
valid, but narrowly enforced patents has two principal consequences.
First, while, in combination, the social losses from loosening the
nonobviousness requirement may roughly approximate the social
gains from narrowing the scope of patents, at least, for those routine
innovations that will remain, extending patent protection to a wider
range of innovative products that would have been forthcoming with
no or less protection reduces the optimal level of uniform protection.
Second, at the same time, the switch removes from the patent system
two of the three doctrines by which courts could attempt to vary the
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level of protection provided to particular innovations. By reducing
the ability of courts to tailor protection to each individual innova-
tion, the switch to routinely valid, but narrowly enforced patents
pushes us towards a more uniform, "one size fits all" system of pat-
ent protection. Given the costs of uniformity, the switch to routinely
valid, but narrowly enforced patents will limit the range of desirable
innovations that the patent system can ensure.
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